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MODERN WASTE LAW, BANKRUPTCY, AND 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 
Jill M. Fraley† 
Around the time of the subprime mortgage collapse, lenders began in 
earnest to sue borrowers by adapting the traditional law of waste. Today, 
these claims continue to rise in frequency and to expand to more 
jurisdictions. Lender waste claims provide a “work around” for state 
mortgage laws that prohibit personal deficiency judgments after foreclosure 
and are potentially non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
While a recent wave of scholarship has addressed the problems of how 
the bankruptcy system handles mortgages, scholars have not yet explored 
the use of waste actions by lenders and how waste judgments intersect with 
bankruptcy and foreclosure. Using new research on the evolution of waste 
law, this Article traces the changes that allowed lenders—who at common 
law had no standing—to bring waste actions and how the doctrine has 
evolved to make those actions more available and more lucrative for 
lenders. 
Drawing on that history, this Article argues that in the context of 
bankruptcy law, waste judgments create multiple problems, including 
frustrating the general purpose of a fresh start, amplifying concerns about 
peonage—particularly given the history of discriminatory subprime 
lending—and further obfuscating an existing circuit split on the rules for 
when a tort claim can be discharged. 
For property law, lender waste claims create additional problems. The 
traditional measure of damages in waste law (market value drop) works 
poorly in the context of underwater mortgages. The traditional split of 
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waste claims into permissive and voluntary intent aligns problematically 
with bankruptcy’s system for determining when a claim may be discharged 
and when it will survive post-bankruptcy. Overall, simply transferring 
standard waste doctrines into the lender context defeats a number of 
important protections of both bankruptcy and mortgage law and is 
inconsistent with property theory, which recognizes the unique context of 
home ownership. 
After examining these challenges in detail, this Article addresses 
whether lenders should have standing and proposes five adjustments to 
traditional waste doctrine in the context of residential mortgages. These 
proposals suggest how waste law should properly evolve to protect both 
lenders and borrowers. 
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In September of 2007, just prior to the subprime mortgage industry 
crash, Christian Mirner and Tamara Cullen-Mirner obtained a loan from 
First Republic Bank to purchase a residence.1 By May 2009, the Mirners 
defaulted on the loan and would later file for Chapter Seven bankruptcy.2 
The bank foreclosed and sold the collateral at less than the amount of the 
loan.3 California law prohibits personal deficiency judgments against 
borrowers when the property is a residence,4 so the bank was unable to 
recover   the   remainder  of   the   mortgage  balance  through   deficiency.5  
 
 
 1 First Republic Bank v. Mirner (In re Mirner), Nos. 09-49872 TT, 10-4009 AT, 2010 Bankr. 
LEXIS 2120, at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 1, 2010). 
 2 Id. at *2. 
 3 Id. 
 4 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 2018). 
 5 Mirner, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at *5. 
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Instead, the bank noted that the Mirners had removed some fixtures from 
the house and filed a tort claim in waste6 for $102,000.7 
Recent empirical research shows that Americans are waiting longer 
to file bankruptcy, often filing after two years of barely managing 
financially.8 During that time, struggling citizens often forgo even basic 
necessities such as food and medical care.9 Unsurprisingly, when faced 
with dire economic circumstances for an extended period of time, 
borrowers might choose to remove and sell fixtures, as the Mirners did, 
while trying to maintain ownership of the home. In other words, the 
fixtures may well be sold to make the mortgage payments. Such actions 
will, however, expose the borrowers to claims under waste law. As the 
Mirners’ case demonstrates, the waste claim could follow borrowers 
despite their subsequent bankruptcy and foreclosure occurring in a 
jurisdiction that rejects personal deficiency judgments.10 Moreover, if the 
borrowers sold fixtures to pay the mortgage and attempt to remain in the 
home, then the lender is suing for waste for money that it already received 
as mortgage payments. 
While a great deal of empirical work has been done in the last five 
years to investigate the mortgage crisis and how filing for bankruptcy 
impacted homeowners, to date, waste actions by lenders have not been 
the object of serious study. Waste actions by lenders are a more recent 
invention; in the common law, lenders did not have standing for waste 
actions.11 In  theory,  the  expansion  of  waste  law to the mortgage context  
 
 
 6 Waste allows a party who holds a future or non-possessory interest in property to recover 
for changes to the estate that detrimentally impact the inheritance. 8 MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.03 (2019). Waste occurs in a variety of contexts, including life 
estates, reversions, leases, and dower property. Id. § 56.02. 
 7 Mirner, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at *3. 
 8 Pamela Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 220, 220–21 (2018). 
 9 Id. at 221. 
 10 See Mirner, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2120, at *6 (reasoning that anti-deficiency legislation did 
not intend to bar bad faith waste claims). 
 11 See RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR & JOHN WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 390–393, 
at 339–43 (1910) (describing, separately, who is “[p]unishable for [w]aste” and who is “[e]ntitled 
to [c]omplain of [w]aste”). 
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occurred in the nineteenth century.12 In reality, lenders brought few cases. 
Spikes in reported cases align with both the Great Depression and the 
subprime mortgage crash.13 But rather than going back down as the 
economy has recovered, lender claims continue to increase.14 This 
continuing increase is especially notable given that after the crash, fewer 
people are buying homes.15 While the alignment of claims with two major 
housing crises would be sufficient to justify a serious investigation, the 
continuing rise of claims makes such an inquiry imperative. 
Using new research on the evolution of waste law, this Article traces 
the changes that allowed lenders—who at the common law had no 
standing—to bring waste actions and how the doctrine has evolved to 
make those actions more available and more lucrative for lenders. This 
Article then considers whether standing for lenders is appropriate in the 
context of the history of waste law, as well as property law more generally. 
In light of how standing has historically worked to protect property 
rights, this Article argues that lenders should have standing to bring 
claims for waste, in part, because a failure to allow such claims would 




 12 In 1976, David Leipziger wrote, “[m]ost of the basic principles governing the real property 
mortgagee’s remedies for waste were worked out in the 19th century.” David A. Leipziger, The 
Mortgagee’s Remedies for Waste, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1976). 
 13 This Article refers periodically to a study of case frequency and type conducted by the 
author. Jill M. Fraley, Mortgage Waste Case Study (2019) (unpublished research) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Mortgage Waste Case Study].  
 14 Id. 
 15 See Laura Kusisto, After Foreclosure, Fewer Buy Homes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2015, at A2; 
Laura Kusisto, More Renters Give up on Buying a Home, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018, 12:41 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-renters-give-up-on-buying-a-home-1522773685 
[https://perma.cc/V98H-GJ66]. Additionally, Kusisto reports that as of March 2018, “fewer 
homes are being built per household than at almost any time in U.S. history.” Laura Kusisto, The 
Next Housing Crisis: A Historic Shortage of New Homes, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2018, 1:51 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-housing-shortage-slams-the-door-on-buyers-
1521395460 [https://perma.cc/5CQ8-WAX6]. 
 16 Concerns about robust private property rights are especially salient at this time, given the 
level of attacks lodged on private property as an inefficient system of ownership. See generally 
Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2017) (reviewing 
the law and economics-based attacks on the fee simple as an efficient mechanism of ownership 
and arguing for the social value that landownership has on individual freedom). 
Fraley.41.2.2 (Do Not Delete) 2/7/2020 2:46 PM 
490 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:485 
Lender waste claims, however, raise a number of problems that 
should be addressed by the courts. In the context of bankruptcy law, this 
Article argues that lender waste claims present three important issues. 
First, lender waste claims risk frustrating the general purpose of a fresh 
start for the debtor, which is a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.17 
Second, lender waste claims amplify existing concerns about peonage.18 
Such concerns are particularly meaningful given the history of 
discriminatory subprime lending.19 Third, the courts are already split—
and on two separate points—about the proper interpretation of the tort 
discharge provision, which determines which tort claims will and will not 
survive to haunt the debtor post-bankruptcy.20 Lender waste claims 
further obfuscate the existing circuit split. 
For property law, this Article argues, lender waste claims create 
additional problems. The traditional measure of damages in waste law—
market value change—works poorly in the context of underwater 
mortgages. The traditional split of waste claims into permissive and 
voluntary intent aligns problematically with the bankruptcy’s system for 
determining when a claim may be discharged and when it will survive 
post-bankruptcy. Overall, simply transferring standard waste doctrines 
into the lender context defeats a number of important protections of both 
bankruptcy and mortgage law and is inconsistent with modern property 
theory. 
All of these problems should be addressed carefully. Recent 
empirical work has demonstrated how difficult it is for borrowers to 
either save the home or financially recover where there is an upside-down  
 
 
 17 For a detailed examination of the Supreme Court precedents addressing the “fresh start” 
concept and the purposes of the concept, see John Patrick Hunt, Help or Hardship?: 
Income-Driven Repayment in Student-Loan Bankruptcies, 106 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1294–300 (2018). 
 18 The strongest statement of the peonage problem, as it exists in current bankruptcy law, is 
found in Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 191 (2009) (arguing that 
the Bankruptcy Code amendments of 2005 realized Thirteenth Amendment constitutional 
difficulties that had been speculative for decades). 
 19 See Carol Necole Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 907, 
910 (2010) (discussing the evidence of discriminatory lending practices that targeted Black and 
Latino families for subprime mortgages). 
 20 See generally Bank Calumet v. Whiters (In re Whiters), 337 B.R. 326 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
2006) (discussing the various splits that have developed in interpreting the appropriate standard 
for exempting tort claims from discharge). 
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mortgage, even without waste claims, finding that “in the majority of 
cases, the bankruptcy system is incapable of saving homes,” principally 
because current provisions of the bankruptcy code ensure that “an 
upside-down first mortgage cannot be reduced.”21 In short, borrowers 
will lose homes when the market value drops substantially, because courts 
will not reduce the loan to the market value.22 Both mortgage and 
bankruptcy law, though, include protections for borrowers. Mortgage law 
in some states, has evolved to prohibit personal deficiency judgments 
against borrowers; this gives the borrowers a clean slate after foreclosure. 
Even in jurisdictions that do not prohibit personal deficiency judgments, 
bankruptcy eliminates personal liability for a past mortgage because such 
claims are dischargeable. Waste law, however, frustrates these 
protections.23 Using tort law, waste claims open the door to judgments 
that follow a borrower after foreclosure and bankruptcy. 
The key purpose of the bankruptcy system for individuals is to 
provide a “fresh start” to the debtor. The “fresh start” language dates to a 
1904 Supreme Court case and the general concept can be found as early 
as 1877.24 Current conditions already reduce the potential for that fresh 
start: recent research shows that people are waiting longer to file 
bankruptcy, even though the delay means that they are less likely to have 
a fresh start on the other side of bankruptcy.25 Additionally, the time 
spent struggling before filing bankruptcy reduces overall wealth and well- 
 
 
 21 Richard S. Gendler, Home Mortgage Cramdown in Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 329, 331 (2014). Gendler examined the effectiveness of bankruptcy proceedings for saving 
a primary residence. Id. at 332. Gendler concluded that current options in bankruptcy for saving 
a primary residence are “overwhelmingly ineffective.” Id. at 331. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Recognizing such intersections is an important lesson from the subprime mortgage crisis. 
In the wake of the crisis, scholars have argued for more holistic frameworks to manage mortgage 
delinquency, because foreclosure laws intersect with a variety of other laws as well as other social 
systems. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of 
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2264 (2008). Jacoby argued, “[i]t no longer 
makes sense for legal scholarship to discuss mortgage enforcement exclusively in terms of 
foreclosure.” Id. Unfortunately, little research has addressed the intersections. Id. 
 24 Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 
1047 n.1 (1987). 
 25 Foohey et al., supra note 8, at 223. 
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being, further diminishing their chances of that fresh start.26 Waste law 
exacerbates this situation, because waste claims follow borrowers in ways 
that a mortgage balance cannot. Waste claims create a personal judgment 
where state mortgage law prevents personal deficiency judgments on 
residences, and, because fixtures are willfully removed, waste claims will 
be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.27 This Article argues that many 
lender waste claims will frustrate borrower protections in mortgage law, 
as well as the debtor’s right to a fresh start. 
Bankruptcy law marks few claims as non-dischargeable, because 
such continuing debts jeopardize the key purpose of bankruptcy law in 
providing a fresh start. Bankruptcy cases, legislative histories, and 
scholarly works document how carefully those choices are made and how 
those choices represent important social policies.28 Tort claims are one of 
the few non-dischargeable debts, but not all tort claims survive 
bankruptcy—only those that include “willful or malicious” acts. There are 
good reasons for tort claims to be non-dischargeable, because otherwise 
bankruptcy could provide a convenient escape for intentional 
tortfeasors.29 Such restrictions on discharge become all the more 
important given that tort law ordinarily provides a variety of key social 
functions, including securing private duties for human rights within the 
domestic context.30 Understandably, Congress has chosen to secure some 
 
 26 Id. at 220–21. 
 27 The Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge those debts “for willful and malicious injury 
by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2018). 
 28 See Howard, supra note 24, at 1047–48. Professor Howard’s Article traces the various 
policy justifications behind the choices between discharge and non-discharge of debts in 
bankruptcy. Howard then articulates a functional and economic approach to coherently integrate 
the multiple policy concerns to create a central theory of discharge. Id. at 1048. 
 29 Id. at 1049. Howard explains the concern that bankruptcy law could become “a shelter for 
debtors who have engaged in dishonesty or in culpable disregard for the rights of other persons.” 
Id. 
 30 Recent scholarly work draws attention to the key role of torts in protecting individual 
human rights in a variety of important circumstances and ensuring a civil remedy for victims. 
See Lisa J. Laplante, Human Torts, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 308–09 (2017) (arguing that a variety 
of different types of tort cases work to secure human rights and provide remedies to individuals). 
Other scholars have similarly considered the role of private law in securing human rights. See, 
e.g., John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008) (considering what 
private duties may exist under human rights law); Nathan J. Miller, Human Rights Abuses as Tort 
Harms: Losses in Translation, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 506 (2016) (describing human rights 
as tort harms in the context of the Alien Tort Statute); Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: 
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torts judgments past bankruptcy. This protection, however, is limited to 
those torts judgments that reflect “willful and malicious” injuries. 
Unfortunately, the circuits have split into multiple camps over two 
different aspects of the “willful and malicious” standard. The courts 
disagree as to whether it is a single concept or a two-part inquiry, and 
additionally disagree as to whether the standard is entirely subjective or 
can be met objectively. Depending on how the circuit interprets the 
discharge provision, this Article argues that waste claims may survive 
bankruptcy and follow the borrower even after a foreclosure. 
Continuing payment obligations arising from waste judgments also 
create constitutional problems due to the loss of future earnings to pay a 
creditor. Scholars have repeatedly argued that circumstances requiring a 
creditor to be repaid with future earnings may create a constitutional 
problem of peonage, or separation of a person from their labor in a way 
that resembles involuntary servitude.31 Renowned bankruptcy scholar, 
Margaret Howard, argued that the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code, which allowed creditors to potentially reach a debtor’s future 
income, created “genuine constitutional difficulties under the Thirteenth 
Amendment” because the borrower’s future income was chained to a past 
debt.32 Waste claims by lenders, this Article argues, create the same types 






Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 62 (1992) (examining private, 
rather than state, duties to comply with human rights law and potential private enforcement of 
those claims); Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights 
Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1995) (examining responses to domestic violence through a 
human rights lens). 
 31 See, e.g., Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 166 (1990) (arguing bankruptcy would enslave debtors 
to creditors “[i]f we required individual debtors with no assets to repay their creditors out of 
future earnings,” because this would separate the person from their labor); Stewart E. Sterk, 
Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 412–17 (1993) (discussing 
whether and how human capital is exempt from creditor claims when compared to other types 
of property); Howard, supra note 18 (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code amendments of 2005 
realized Thirteenth Amendment constitutional difficulties that had been speculative for decades). 
 32  Howard, supra note 18, at 191. 
Fraley.41.2.2 (Do Not Delete) 2/7/2020 2:46 PM 
494 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:485 
In addition to the bankruptcy and constitutional concerns, lender 
waste claims also pose problems for the logically and theoretically 
consistent development of property law. There are good reasons to 
reconsider waste doctrines in the residential mortgage context. This is 
particularly true given that courts have arguably moved toward 
embracing a more progressive and more social theory of property law.33 
To address these key doctrinal questions, this Article provides a new 
descriptive account of the evolution of waste claims by lenders. After 
examining the history, this Article provides a set of five specific proposals 
about how the law of waste should properly evolve to protect both lenders 
and borrowers in the residential mortgage context. 
Part I begins with a brief primer of waste law to familiarize the reader 
with the doctrine in general, and specifically three aspects of the doctrine 
that are important for discussing waste in the context of mortgages: 
standing, permissive waste, and remedies. Part I then focuses on standing, 
the limiting factor of waste law for lenders. This Part explains the 
historical standing rules, which would have excluded lenders from 
bringing waste claims. This Part then turns to the evolution of standing 
in waste law to include lenders. This Part draws particular attention to 
districts that resist standing for lenders or limit remedies to injunctions, 
as well as to other ways that courts have limited the cause of action in the 
context of mortgages by adding hurdles for lenders. 
Based on this history, Part II addresses the question of whether 
mortgagees should have standing to sue for waste. This Part considers 
two different approaches. First, this Part considers a theoretical approach 
to the question based on the nature of the mortgagees’ interest in the 
property. Second, this Part considers how the lien or title approach has 
influenced states with respect to adoption of the substantial impairment 
limitation on mortgagees. Finally, this Part addresses the relationship 
between   title  or   lien   theory  and   the   adoption of  possession   as   a  
 
 
 33 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 912–14 (2018) 
(arguing that modern regulatory takings show that of the three primary theoretical approaches 
to property, the most prominent is now the property-as-society approach). More generally, one 
might argue that progressive property theory is expanding. For example, see Jessica L. Roberts, 
Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105 (2018), for an argument expanding 
progressive property theory to the context of ownership of genetic information. 
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requirement for mortgagees—thus effectively preventing remedies for 
the mortgagee before foreclosure. 
Part III provides an account of how applying waste law in the 
residential mortgage context creates issues for bankruptcy law. This Part 
addresses the fresh start concept, which is a central purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code, demonstrating how waste law may frustrate the fresh 
start. This Part also demonstrates how lender waste claims amplify 
existing concerns about peonage. Finally, this Part addresses the current 
circuit split on the tort discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Code and 
explains how waste claims further obfuscate the existing circuit split, and 
then makes a proposal for how lender waste claims should be treated 
under the discharge provision. 
Part IV focuses on property law and delves into the details of how 
importing traditional waste doctrines into the mortgage context has the 
potential to create serious and unjust impacts for borrowers. This Part 
addresses, in particular, the doctrine of permissive waste, the potential 
availability of extraordinary remedies, the problem of measuring 
damages in the mortgage context, and the possibility of duplicative 
recovery or circumventing anti-deficiency statutes. 
Part V adds to the recommendation for how to interpret waste intent 
under the bankruptcy discharge provision by addressing best practices 
for lender waste cases in the state courts. Part V makes a set of five specific 
proposals about how the law of waste should properly evolve to protect 
both lenders and borrowers. 
The Article proposes, first, that injunctive relief should always be 
available to lenders to protect the adequacy of the security interest, 
provided that the issue is voluntary rather than permissive waste. Second, 
the Article suggests that extraordinary remedies of waste law—forfeiture 
and treble damages—should not be available in the mortgage context via 
waste law. Third, the Article maintains that where there is a deficiency on 
a mortgage, and some portion of the reduction in property value is 
attributable to economics beyond the control of the mortgagor, the 
mortgagee should only be able to recover for waste committed in bad 
faith. Fourth, the Article concludes that lenders should not be able to use 
waste law to sue for permissive waste, except where that waste was 
committed in bad faith. Finally, the Article proposes that because waste 
law is a remedy in tort and a lender will always have remedies available 
through contract within the context of residential mortgages, the lender 
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should be limited to recovery where the damages creates a “substantial 
impairment” of the security. 
I.     THE EVOLUTION OF WASTE LAW IN THE MORTGAGE CONTEXT 
Waste law is a historic cause of action, dating to the Statute of 
Marlborough, and thus it has a long and complex history. This Part 
begins with a brief primer on the core concepts involved in waste law and 
follows that with the history of standing for waste law. This Part then 
details the expansion of standing to include lenders as plaintiffs and 
creates a detailed history of how the courts altered traditional waste law 
to implement limitations on cases brought by lenders. 
A.     A Brief Primer of Relevant Waste Doctrines 
Before addressing the specific situation of mortgages, it is 
appropriate to begin with the basic doctrines of the common law rule of 
waste.34 A cause of action for waste allows a 
 
 34 “Waste is a tort.” Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 241 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wash. 
2010) (en banc) (quoting WILLIAM WOODFALL, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 469 (6th 
ed. 1822)). Not all claims based on “waste” are actually causes of action in waste. Indeed, some 
are not based on the traditional doctrine, but instead plaintiffs base their claims on the breach of 
a specific contract provision that forbids “waste.” For example, a provision might say that the 
mortgagor “shall keep the Mortgaged Premises in good repair and shall not commit waste 
thereon.” Estate of Hatfield v. Hatfield, No. 82A01-0708-CV-375, 2008 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1219, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2008). Thus, waste claims can arise from “an economic loss 
remediable under the law of contracts.” Eastwood, 241 P.3d at 1260–61. Such actions would be 
logically quite different from a waste cause of action in that the ordinary tort rules would not 
apply to a claim based on the breach of a term in a contract. The primary difference is that with 
“an economic loss as an injury in a contractual relationship ‘where the parties could or should 
have allocated the risk of loss, or had the opportunity to do so.’” Id. (quoting Alejandre v. Bull, 
153 P.3d 864, 870 (Wash. 2007)). Some jurisdictions have concluded that it is possible for a breach 
of a contract to be simultaneously a breach of a tort duty that “arises independently.” The 
Washington Supreme Court concluded in 2010 that “an independent tort duty can overlap with 
a contractual obligation.” Id. The alternative position is that “‘the purpose of the economic loss 
rule is to bar recovery for alleged breach of tort duties where a contractual relationship exists and 
the losses are economic losses,’ and ‘[i]f the economic loss rule applies, the party will be held to 
contract remedies, regardless of how the plaintiff characterizes the claims.’” Id. at 1261 (quoting 
Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 870). The Washington Supreme Court resolved the question of whether 
both claims are simultaneously possible: “The test is not simply whether an injury is an economic 
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reversioner/remainderman/future interest holder to recover against a 
tenant for changes to the estate that detrimentally impact the 
inheritance.35 Waste arises in a variety of contexts, including life estates, 
reversions, and dower property.36 The common law has long protected 
the reversioner’s interest.37 
The parties liable for waste and the parties granted standing to bring 
a cause of action for waste have changed throughout time. Initially, 
formal procedures limited the parties able to receive relief.38 Historian of 
waste Wyndham Anstis Bewes argued that in the oldest formulation, only 
three parties were liable for waste, because they were liable via the 
operation of law, rather than “by contract or quasi contract;” these three 
parties were: “tenants in dower and by the curtesy, and guardians in 
chivalry.”39 Notably, Bewes’s list of parties liable then also limits those 
parties who can recover; there is no leasehold or mortgage relationship 
listed within the three described.40 Blackstone, similarly, described waste 
in terms of the specific and limited parties protected by the doctrine: 
Waste  is   a  “spoil  or  destruction  in  houses,  gardens,  trees,  or   other  
 
loss arising from a breach of contract, but rather whether the injury is traceable also to a breach 
of a tort law duty of care arising independently of the contract.” Id. at 1264. The court noted that 
it was not alone in so concluding: “Other states use the same approach.” Id. at 1264 (“A breach 
of a duty arising independently of any contract duties between the parties . . . may support a tort 
action.” (quoting Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 
463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995))); see also Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. 
Touche Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 503, 514 (Ill. 1994) (“Where a duty arises outside of the contract, 
the economic loss doctrine does not prohibit recovery in tort for the negligent breach of that 
duty.”); Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (N.Y. 1992) (“A legal duty 
independent of contractual obligations may be imposed by law as an incident to the parties’ 
relationship.”). In fact, it is agreeable that the Supreme Court of Colorado’s belief “that a more 
accurate designation of what is commonly termed the ‘economic loss rule’ would be the 
‘independent duty rule.’” Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 n.8 (Colo. 2000) 
(en banc). 
 35 WOLF, supra note 6, § 56.02. 
 36 MINOR & WURTS, supra note 11 (describing, separately, who is “[p]unishable for [w]aste” 
and who is “[e]ntitled to [c]omplain of [w]aste”). 
 37 WOLF, supra note 6, § 56.02. 
 38 Id. 
 39 WYNDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE LAW OF WASTE 1 (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1894). 
 40 See 2 CHARLES H. SCRIBNER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOWER 795 (2d ed., Philadelphia, 
T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1883) (“[L]iability did not extend to lessee for life, or for years.”). 
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corporeal hereditaments, to the disherison of him that hath the 
remainder or reversion in fee-simple or fee-tail.”41 Both the list of parties 
liable for waste and the parties positioned to sue have enlarged since 
Bewes’s era.42 Given that the duty arises in the context of a relationship, 
it is unsurprising that the law would expand in a symmetrical way: 
enlarging both the parties who are liable and the parties who have 
standing to sue.43 
Another important aspect of the waste doctrine is the 
characterization of the claim as either permissive or voluntary.44 
Permissive waste arises not through malicious actions, but instead 
through  some  omission.45  Omissions  might  be  related  to  maintenance  
 
 41 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England, in THE STUDENT’S 
BLACKSTONE 189 (Robert Malcolm Kerr ed., London, John Murray 1873). 
 42 For one of the earlier discussions of the evolution of the parties, see George W. Kirchwey, 
Liability for Waste. I. At Common Law, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1908) (discussing the shifting 
liabilities of parties over time). 
 43 While the standing side has evolved to include mortgagees, the focus of this Article, the 
liability side, has also expanded broadly. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained: 
At common law the reversioner might sue the life tenant for damages for 
waste, but, as privity of estate between the parties was necessary to the 
maintenance of an action for waste, he might not sue one claiming under 
the life tenant or a stranger. This rule, however, no longer prevails, and the 
modern action to recover damages may be maintained against the life tenant 
or a subtenant or a stranger. 
Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 95 N.E. 225, 227 (Ind. 1911) (citation omitted). 
 44 Many modern writers divide waste into three categories: voluntary, permissive, and 
ameliorating. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste 
in American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2011); see also 5 ARTHUR W. 
BLAKEMORE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 380, at 323 (1917) (describing two types of waste, 
permissive and voluntary); 1 CHARLES T. BOONE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 113, at 300 (1901) 
(categorizing two types of waste: permissive and voluntary); MINOR & WURTS, supra note 11, at 
331–32 (categorizing waste as either voluntary or permissive, and later discussing amelioration 
within those structures); GEORGE V. YOOL, AN ESSAY ON WASTE, NUISANCE, AND TRESPASS 3 
(London, W. Maxwell 1863) (describing ameliorating waste, then concluding that all waste is 
“either voluntary or permissive”). 
 45 MINOR & WURTS, supra note 11, § 380, at 332–33, § 386, at 337. Formally defined, 
“[p]ermissive waste implies negligence or omission to do that which will prevent injury, as, for 
instance, to suffer a house to go to decay for want of repair or to deteriorate from neglect.” Jowdy 
v. Guerin, 457 P.2d 745, 748–49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (citing Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 191 P.2d 
858, 863 (Wash. 1948)). 
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not undertaken (such as fixing a roof leak), but also might include the 
non-payment of taxes.46 Voluntary waste occurs when the tenant acts to 
harm the property directly, such as by tearing down a wall.47 
Under the common law rule, whether the allegation was for 
permissive or voluntary waste, there was a single three-part test to 
determine whether waste had occurred. The act or omission had to create 
waste: “(1) [b]y diminishing the value of the estate; (2) [b]y increasing the 
burthen upon it; (3) [b]y impairing the evidence of title.”48 
Remedies for waste included both equitable and legal relief. Courts 
rarely bothered with nominal damages,49 but otherwise enforced waste 
law stringently, using treble damage awards,50 as well as injunctions.51 
Courts also, in time, granted the extraordinary remedy of forfeiture of the 
estate.52 
While waste law has evolved substantially over time, and there are a 
wide variety of other doctrines that may be of interest to scholars, this 
Section has highlighted three aspects in particular: standing, permissive 
waste, and remedies. Each of these three aspects of the doctrine of waste 
is important to consider when waste law moves into the context of 
mortgages. 
B.     Standing for Waste Claims 
The logic of standing emerges from the nature of waste, as it has 
evolved to a more general concept. While waste once protected only a 
specific set of relationships (dower and life tenancies), it evolved into a 
more  general  set  of  duties  imposed on a person who possesses land to  
 
 46 In its strictest formulation at the common law, this went so far as to include liability for 
“mischance,” which suggests liability without negligence. YOOL, supra note 44, at 56. 
 47 MINOR & WURTS, supra note 11, §§ 380–381, at 332–33. 
 48 YOOL, supra note 44, at 2. 
 49 See BEWES, supra note 39, at 125–29. 
 50 Id. at 9 (discussing the “merciless” application of the rule, including treble damages, in 
cases of ameliorative waste). 
 51 1 WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 
§§ 27–28, at 67 (London, A. Strahan 1804). 
 52  See Roby v. Newton, 49 S.E. 694, 682 (Ga. 1905) (explaining when the remedy of forfeiture 
is appropriate). 
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“not unreasonably injure one who has a right or possibility of future 
possession.”53 In this more general formulation of a duty, “waste is, 
functionally, a part of the law which keeps in balance the conflicting 
desires of persons having interests in the same land.”54 The more general 
formulation then led to expansion of the list of parties who were liable for 
waste and the list of parties who had standing to sue for waste. The 
remainder of this Section discusses this evolution in detail, because 
standing is the limiting factor of waste law for mortgagees. This Part 
begins by explaining the traditional standing rules, which would have 
excluded mortgagees from bringing waste claims. This Part then turns to 
the evolution of standing in waste law to include mortgagees. This Part 
draws particular attention to districts that resist standing for mortgagees 
or limit remedies to injunctions, as well as to other ways that courts have 
limited the cause of action in the context of mortgages by adding hurdles 
for mortgagees. 
C.     Traditional Standing Rules 
Initially, only three parties were liable for waste: “tenants in dower 
and by the curtesy, and guardians in chivalry.”55 Later, the list expanded 
to include those parties who possessed a “remainder or reversion in fee-
simple or fee-tail.”56 
Traditionally, waste did not offer a cause of action for lessees. This 
is particularly important in the context of mortgages because of the 




 53 Meyer v. Hansen, 373 N.W.2d 392, 395 (N.D. 1985) (citing 2 HERBERT THORNDIKE 
TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 630 (3d ed. 1939)). This more general 
approach then gives us another definition of waste: “Waste may be defined as an unreasonable 
or improper use, abuse, mismanagement, or omission of duty touching real estate by one 
rightfully in possession, which results in a substantial injury.” Id. (citing 4 THOMPSON, REAL 
PROPERTY § 1853). 
 54 Id. at 395 (citing Smith v. Cap Concrete, 184 Cal. Rptr. 308 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
 55 BEWES, supra note 39, at 1; see also SCRIBNER, supra note 40, at 795 (describing the three 
original parties liable for waste). 
 56 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *281. 
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Lessees for life and for years were not liable. This distinction was 
made for the reason that tenancies of the character first named 
were created by law, and the law must therefore furnish a 
remedy for a violation of the rights of the owner of the 
inheritance; and lessees for life or for years acquired their 
interest by contract with the owner of the fee, who could have 
protected himself against loss in this respect.57  
Minor on Real Property explained,  
[t]hose tenants of particular estates who come in by the act of the 
parties, are at common law liable not otherwise than upon their 
covenants; and if the landlord make no provision, by express 
agreement, against waste, he is in those cases (independently of 
statute) without remedy, and is left to suffer the consequences 
of his neglect.58  
The rule in the common law was that “the writ of waste lay only against 
the tenants of estates created by the law, as distinguished from those 
which came into being through act of the owner.”59 The substantial 
remedies of waste, therefore, applied to protect property interests created 
by law, and not those that were created independently by contract, like 
leases and mortgages. 
D.     Expansion of Standing to Mortgages 
Even as waste law began to expand, courts still emphasized the 
specific relationship of the parties involved and the nature of the property 
interests at stake. Waste, courts concluded, is not “to be applied inflexibly, 
without regard to the quality of the estate or the relation to it of the person 
charged to have committed the wrong.”60 Rather, the appropriate 
investigation is a contextual one: “the question as to whether it has been 
committed in a given case is to be determined in view of the particular 
 
 57 Roby, 49 S.E. at 680. 
 58 1 RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 437, at 529–30 (1908). 
 59 Camden Tr. Co. v. Handle, 26 A.2d 865, 867 (N.J. 1942). 
 60 Chapman v. Cooney, 57 A. 928, 929 (R.I. 1904). 
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facts and circumstances appearing in that case.”61 This meant that early 
expansion of standing rules was, at first, quite limited. 
Initially, expanding standing to mortgagees came with limitations. 
Within the nineteenth century, courts expanded standing to mortgagees 
for waste actions in courts of equity.62 Courts reasoned that coverage of 
the mortgage situation “rests upon the broad equitable consideration, 
that, during the life of the mortgage, the security it affords ought to be 
preserved unimpaired; that the mortgagor, and whoever stands in his 
shoes, is in conscience bound to its preservation.”63 Such an expansion to 
only equitable remedies essentially just provided a way for the mortgagee 
to make sure there was no “interference before, and not after a decree of 
foreclosure and sale, which settles conclusively the rights and equities of 
the parties.”64 Under such logic, the mortgagee’s standing was limited to 
only equitable relief. 
Additionally, in the earliest cases, equitable relief might be limited 
to only acts of voluntary waste rather than permissive waste. In 
Pennsylvania, for example, the court reasoned that they would only be 
concerned with “actual waste of the mortgaged premises.”65 The court 
refused to consider an injunction simply for “mere non-payment of taxes 
and failure of the mortgagor to apply rents in payment of the mortgage.”66 
Nineteenth century commentators supported the approach of 
limiting waste to only equitable remedies for mortgagees. Chancellor 




 61 Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Malone & Foote v. Marriott, 64 Ala. 486, 493 (1879) (reinstating an injunction 
protecting a mortgagee on the grounds that it protected the party’s interests prior to the filing of 
the foreclosure suit). 
 63 Id. at 492–93; see also Hastings v. Perry, 20 Vt. 272, 278 (1848) (“Of the right of the 
mortgagee to an injunction to restrain the mortgagor from the commission of waste, by which 
the mortgage security is in danger of being reduced in value below the amount of the mortgage 
debt, there can be no question. The doctrine has been too long established, and too frequently 
acted upon in this State, to be now controverted.”). 
 64 Malone & Foote, 64 Ala. at 493. 
 65 Abraham Rosenblatt Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Miller, 13 Pa. D. & C. 73, 74 (Ct. Com. Pl. 
1929). 
 66 Id. 
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[t]he mortgagor may exercise the rights of an owner while in 
possession, provided he does nothing to impair the security; but 
a court of chancery will always, on the application of the 
mortgagee, and with that object in view, stay the commission of 
waste by the process of injunction. An action at law by the 
mortgagee, will not lie for the commission of waste, because he 
has only a contingent interest.67 
Within the nineteenth century, some state courts began to expand 
standing for mortgagees to go beyond courts of equity. A seminal case, 
often cited in other states, is the New York case of Van Pelt v. McGraw.68 
The court focused on the fact that “[t]he rights of the holder of the 
mortgage were therefore paramount to [the mortgagor’s] rights, and any 
attempt on his part to impair the mortgage as a security, was a violation 
of the plaintiff’s rights.”69 The court concluded that the law would support 
a case for waste, because “[t]he plaintiff’s security was thereby 
impaired.”70 The court noted that when the mortgagee sues for waste, the 
“action is not based upon the assumption that the plaintiff’s land has been 
injured, but that his mortgage as a security has been impaired.”71 Because 
of this, the court determined that “[h]is damages, therefore, would be 
limited to the amount of injury to the mortgage, however great the injury 
to the land might be.”72 Notably, the court went on to conclude that the 
timing of the suit for waste vis-à-vis foreclosure proceedings was 
irrelevant: “It could, therefore, be of no consequence whether the injury 
occurred before or after forfeiture of the mortgage.”73 As other courts 
adopted the rule of standing for the mortgagee, not all followed the 
remainder of the court’s lenient approach for such cases. With those 
limitations on the precedent, however, a number of jurisdictions adopted 
the new approach to standing in this era. 
 
 
 67 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 165–66 (7th ed., New York, William 
Kent 1851). 
  68 Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N.Y. 110, 112 (1850). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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By 1860, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that “a 
mortgagee . . . is entitled to maintain a legal action for waste against a 
mortgagor.”74 Similarly, California adopted this approach in 1864, 
judicially with later codification.75 In Robinson v. Russell,76 the court 
concluded “that an action can be maintained by the mortgagee . . . when 
it appears that by the acts complained of the mortgage security is 
impaired.”77 The court cited a few cases in support of this proposition, 
including Van Pelt.78 The court paused to note that all of the cited cases 
“were actions on the case for the wrongful and fraudulent injury 
committed upon the premises, whereby the mortgagee’s security was 
impaired.”79 The court did not, however, focus on the wrongful and 
fraudulent nature of the injury, but rather on the security interest. The 
court concluded that the mortgagee had standing, at least in equity:  
There can be as little doubt that the mortgagee may, by 
injunction, stay the commission of waste upon the mortgaged 
premises, when he makes a proper case in equity and shows that 
the commission of the threatened acts will materially impair the 
value of the property subject to the lien so as to render it an 
inadequate security for the mortgage debt.80 
With that said, the court did limit the availability of equitable relief. The 
court found  that either (1)  the  injuries needed  to be   irreparable, or (2)  
 
 
 74 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Spencer’s Kenosha Bowl, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109, 111–12 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1987) (internal citation omitted). 
 75 Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 987 (Cal. 1975) (explaining that California adopted 
a statute creating a duty not to commit waste on property with a lien against it). 
 76 Robinson v. Russell, 24 Cal. 467 (1864). 
 77 Id. at 473; see also Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Kilbey, 676 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 
(“In Indiana, the mortgagor who is in possession may exercise all acts of ownership, even to the 
committing of acts which might be considered waste, provided he does not ‘render unsafe the 
debts secured by the mortgage.’” (citation omitted)); McCorristin v. Salmon Signs, 582 A.2d 
1271, 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“[I]f the waste or damage to the mortgaged property 
threatens to impair the mortgagee’s security, and the mortgagor has failed or refused either to 
pursue the claim or to take other steps to avoid prejudicing the mortgagee’s interest, the 
mortgagee has the right to protect his interest by pursuing the claim.”). 
 78 Robinson, 24 Cal. at 473. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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there needed not to be an available recovery in an action for trespass, 
because the defendants “are insolvent or unable to respond in damages 
for the alleged or threatened injury.”81 Without such a show, the court 
concluded that an injunction could not properly be issued.82 
In 1884, the Maine Supreme Court considered the rights of the 
mortgagee to bring a claim for waste.83 The court concluded, “[t]he action 
(quare clausum fregit) lies by mortgagee against mortgagor for strip and 
waste.”84 The court held that liability could exist for “abusing [the 
property] in certain ways.”85 The threshold the court established was 
liability for “any act causing substantial and permanent injury.”86 
Writing in 1903, the Alabama Supreme Court focused on the duty 
of the mortgagee “to conserve the integrity of the property,” and 
concluded that as a result, “[i]t is clear to us that the mortgagee is liable 
for the waste.”87 The focus was no longer on the division between 
contractual relationships and property relationships, but more generally 
on any relationship between concurrent holders of interests in land: “As 
the action evolved during the ensuing development of the common law, 
it was broadened so as to afford protection to concurrent holders of 
interests in land who were out of possession (e.g., mortgagees) from harm 
committed by persons who were in possession (e.g., mortgagors).”88 
In adopting the expanded standing rule, some courts specifically 
adopted a broad definition of waste that included both voluntary and 
permissive waste. For example, in Minnesota, the Supreme Court found 
in 1922 that “[s]peaking in general terms it may be said that a mortgagor 
is chargeable with waste within the meaning of the rule whenever, 
through the fault of the mortgagor, the mortgagee loses some part of the 
security which he had when he took his mortgage.”89 The court gave 
examples:  
 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Vehue v. Mosher, 76 Me. 469, 470 (1884). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Pollard v. Am. Freehold Land Mortg. Co., 35 So. 767, 772 (Ala. 1903). 
 88 Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 986 (Cal. 1975). 
 89 Nielsen v. Heald, 186 N.W. 299, 300 (Minn. 1922). 
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Failure to pay claims or charges which were not liens on the 
property when the mortgage was taken, but which, if not paid, 
will become liens thereon superior to the mortgage, is deemed 
waste within the rule. Failure to pay interest on prior mortgages 
or to pay taxes falls within this species of waste.90  
Similarly, Mississippi adopted a wide definition, simply including all acts 
that impair the value of the mortgaged property.91 
Not all courts considered expanding standing in the nineteenth 
century. Some expansion occurred by statute in the late twentieth 
century. In Maryland, for example, “the law of waste continues to evolve 
and Maryland, among other states, now recognizes the responsibility of a 
mortgagor to protect the value of a mortgagee’s security from 
impairment.”92 A Maryland statute provides that “[a]ny mortgagor, 
including a grantor under a deed of trust given as security for the payment 
of a debt or the performance of an obligation . . . who, without express or 
implied authorization, commits or permits waste is liable for the actual 
damages suffered by the property.”93 As of 2001, however, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals found that the statute was not actually in use. The court 
noted that “[i]ndeed, there are no Maryland cases in which a mortgagor 
has been held liable to a mortgagee for waste.”94 
Other courts have allowed claims by mortgagees only much more 
recently—with a number adopting expanded standing rules between the 




 90 Id. 
 91 Planters’ Mfg. Co. v. Greenwood Agency Co., 152 So. 476, 477 (Miss. 1934). Nebraska 
adopted a similarly wide rule. See Vybiral v. Schildhauer, 265 N.W. 241, 244 (Neb. 1936). The 
court concluded that  
[a] mortgagee has the right to maintain a suit to prevent waste by mortgagor 
in possession where the security of the mortgage debt is impaired or there is 
danger of the mortgaged property becoming insufficient security for the 
mortgage debt, and a mortgagee may properly include such application to 
prevent waste in the petition to foreclose the mortgage.  
Id. at 242. 
 92 Boucher Invs., L.P. v. Annapolis-West, 784 A.2d 39, 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
 93 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-102 (West 2018). 
 94 Boucher Invs., 784 A.2d at 48. 
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in a detailed examination of the history of waste claims to support their 
adoption of the expanded rule of standing. 
For example, the Arizona bankruptcy court considered the issue in 
1992.95 The court affirmed the expansive take, reasoning that “[c]laims 
for waste have evolved far beyond the original English statutes and 
common law claims. No longer do courts require that a plaintiff in a waste 
action hold a future interest.”96 The court then cited the ever-expanding 
list of parties who have standing, noting simply that these parties are the 
“holder[s] of a current interest.”97 Based on that, the court reasoned that 
“a vendor of real property, a lessor of real property, or a mortgagee, may 
maintain an action for waste.”98 
Montana did not address the issue of waste in the context of 
mortgages until 1997. In Turner v. Kerin & Associates, the Montana 
Supreme Court reviewed decisions from across the country dating back 
to the nineteenth century.99 The court ultimately concluded, “[w]e agree 
that a mortgagee may state a cause of action against a mortgagor for 
actions or inactions which damage the collateral and thereby impair the 
mortgagee’s ability to satisfy the secured debt.”100 
One product of the process of expanding standing for waste cases is 
that the very definition of the cause of action changed in many 
jurisdictions. The cause was no longer limited to any particular set of 
property relationships (such as life tenant-reversioner, lessor-lessee, etc.). 
Instead, some courts adopted wide definitions such as this one: “[T]he 
unreasonable conduct by the owner of a possessory estate that results in 
physical damage to the real estate and substantial diminution in the value 
of the estates in which others have an interest.”101 
Waste has also expanded in other ways in recent years, at least in 
some  jurisdictions.  The  traditional  rule  of   waste  limited  coverage  to  
 
 
 95 In re Evergreen Ventures, 147 B.R. 751, 754–55 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. (citing 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 56.06 (1992)). 
 99 Turner v. Kerin & Assocs., 938 P.2d 1368, 1371–72 (Mont. 1997). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Spencer’s Kenosha Bowl, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109, 111–12 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1987) (quoting Pleasure Time, Inc. v. Kuss, 254 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Wis. 1977)). 
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situations involving “permanent injury” to a property.102 In 2013, the 
Vermont Supreme Court enlarged this definition substantially by 
extending it to non-permanent damages. The court “explicitly define[d] 
waste to include repairable damage to property.”103 As a result, the court 
was able to affirm a finding of waste related to “removal of items and 
neglect” because such actions “constituted a substantial injury to the 
property, even though they could be repaired and replaced so as to avoid 
a permanent diminution of property value.”104 
Treatises supported the expansion of standing to mortgagees. By 
1975, an American Jurisprudence article noted that anyone with “a 
specific lien against real estate has a right to restrain waste by the owner 
of the real estate.”105 Courts specifically cited to the treatise in adopting or 
affirming the wider standing rule.106 
Similarly, the Third Restatement of Property also advocated 
standing for mortgagees in causes of action for waste. The Restatement 
described the cause of action’s prima facie case in the context of a 
mortgage: 
(a) Waste occurs when, without the mortgagee’s consent, the 
mortgagor: (1) physically changes the real estate, whether 
negligently or intentionally, in a manner that reduces its value; 
(2) fails to maintain and repair the real estate in a reasonable 
manner, except for repair of casualty damage or acts of third 
parties not the fault of the mortgagor; (3) fails to pay before 
delinquency property taxes or governmental assessments 
secured by a lien having priority over the mortgage; (4) 
materially fails to comply with covenants in the mortgage 
respecting the physical care, maintenance, construction, 
demolition,  or  insurance  against  casualty  of  the real estate or  
 
 
 102 Prue v. Royer, 67 A.3d 895, 914–15 (Vt. 2013). 
 103 Id. at 915. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing 78 AM. JUR. 
2D Waste § 13 (1975)). 
 106 See, e.g., id. 
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improvements on it; or (5) retains possession of rents to which 
the mortgagee has the right of possession under § 4.2.107 
E.     Expansion of Standing in the Mortgage Context: Special Limitations 
1.     Equitable Remedies Only 
One approach to limiting standing for mortgagees is to limit the 
remedies to equitable ones only, prohibiting damages awards. This 
approach mirrors the early adoption of the expanded standing approach, 
specifically within the context of courts of equity only. The Kansas 
Supreme Court, for example, found that when a mortgagor “impairs the 
mortgage security the remedy of the mortgagee is not at law, but in 
equity . . . generally [an] injunction to restrain the commission of waste 
upon the realty.”108 
Some courts not only adopted the equitable remedies approach, but 
also limited this approach to more severe situations of waste. The 
Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded in 1880 that the mortgagee could 
only receive an injunction where “the waste complained of endangered 
the rights of the lien creditor.”109 In other words, the security had to be 
inadequate before the court would intervene. West Virginia adopted a 
similar rule, finding that “a court of equity will not interfere to restrain [a 
mortgagor] . . . until it is made to appear to the court,” that the waste will 
“render the land an incompetent security for the amount due upon the 
mortgage.”110 Thus, the justices concluded, “I can never assent to the 
issuing of an injunction in behalf of a mortgagee in such a case, unless he 
shows, that it is necessary to preserve his security.”111 
 
 
 107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 4.6 (AM. LAW INST. 1997). 
 108 Vanderslice v. Knapp, 20 Kan. 647, 649 (1878). 
 109 Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568, 570 (1880). 
 110 Core v. Bell, 20 W. Va. 169, 173 (1882) (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
OF JURISPRUDENCE § 915 (11th ed., Boston, Brown, and Company 1873); Brady v. Waldron, 2 
Johns. Ch. 148 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); Hippesly v. Spencer (1820) 56 Eng. Rep. 956; 5 Madd. 422; 
Farrant v. Lovel (1750) 26 Eng. Rep. 1214; 3 Atk. 723; Wright v. Atkyns (1813) 15 Eng. Rep. 122; 
1 Ves. & Bea. 314; Scott v. Wharton, 2 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 25 (1808)). 
 111 Core, 20 W. Va. at 173. 
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Notably, when courts pursue this approach, it is not generally a rule 
of “substantial impairment,” but rather a softer rule. As the Oregon 
Supreme Court explained, in the context of seeking an injunction, “[s]uch 
acts as will render the security insufficient for the satisfaction of the debt, 
or of doubtful sufficiency, constitute, according to the consensus of 
authority, an impairment of the security, through the commission of 
waste.”112 The important point is not clear impairment, but indeed, acts 
that would “so far impair the value of the property as to render the 
security of doubtful sufficiency. . . . [A]nd it is not enough that its value 
may be barely equal to the debt.”113 
Modern courts have retained the equity only approach in a number 
of jurisdictions, absent extraordinary circumstances, such as bad faith. 
Connecticut courts, for example, find that “[g]enerally, a mortgagee’s 
remedy for waste is via injunction.”114 One can also infer this position for 
courts such as the Alabama Supreme Court, that dismiss waste claims 
when the mortgagee files for foreclosure.115 
Adopting only equitable remedies has effectively prevented (at least 
reported) cases within the twentieth century in a number of states. In 
Wyoming, for example, there are very few cases of waste in the entire 
twentieth century. This is likely a product of the fact that there is no 
assurance that there is a cause of action at law for mortgagees. The case 
law only seems to suggest equitable remedies. The general rule in 
Wyoming is that the mortgagee has a right to “restrain” action, but even 
this right is qualified to situations where “the property would be 
diminished in value by the threatened removal to such an extent as to 
render the mortgage security insufficient or inadequate.”116 
Kansas resembles Wyoming in that there are few modern cases. The 
few cases that exist suggest that remedies may be limited to injunctions 
 
 112 Beaver Flume & Lumber Co. v. Eccles, 73 P. 201, 202 (Or. 1903) (citing State v. N. Cent. 
Ry. Co., 18 Md. 193 (1862)). 
 113 Id. 
 114 BRE, Inc. v. Superior Block & Supply Co., No. CV 95380707, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2783, at *10 n.7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1997). 
 115 See, e.g., Edelman v. Poe, 103 So. 2d 333, 334 (Ala. 1958) (holding that pendency of 
foreclosure suit required dismissal of waste claim for damages). 
 116 Anderson v. Englehart, 108 P. 977, 979 (Wyo. 1910). 
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or the appointment of a receiver during the foreclosure process to prevent 
waste.117 
New Hampshire also has few reported cases of waste in the mortgage 
context; there are none within the twentieth century that are a mortgagee 
against a mortgagor. The rule in New Hampshire is that a mortgagee has 
rights only insofar as it may be necessary to enable him to prevent waste, 
and to keep the land from being in any way diminished in value, or to 
receive the rents and profits, and to give him the full benefit of his 
security, and appropriate remedies for any violation of his rights under 
the mortgage.118 
 
2.     Inadequate Mortgage Security and Damages Limited to Security 
Interest 
One approach to limiting the standing of lenders that courts adopted 
was to create a more stringent threshold for damages. Some courts 
adopted a rule that lenders only had standing for waste where the waste 
was sufficient to render the security “inadequate” or “insufficient.”119 For 
example, under Florida law, “when a mortgagee brings an action for 
injury to a security interest the mortgagee is entitled to 100% security for 
the debt owed and not, unless otherwise contracted for, more than 
that.”120 For standing then, the mortgagee must “demonstrate that the 
mortgage security has been injured and is now worth less than the 
amount of the outstanding debt.”121 
Notably, the strict standard may go beyond simply impairing the 
mortgage security to creating a “substantial” impairment. As the Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin explained, there was a “common law rule that, in 
lien  jurisdictions,  a mortgagee cannot recover until his security has been  
 
 
 117 See Garrett v. Dickerson, No. 73,404, 1996 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 266, at *23–24 (Kan. 
Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1996) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414(l) (1996)). 
 118 Morse v. Whitcher, 15 A. 207, 209 (N.H. 1888). 
 119 Moriarty v. Ashworth, 44 N.W. 531, 531 (Minn. 1890); Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433, 436 
(1865); see also Vanderslice v. Knapp, 20 Kan. 647 (1878). 
 120 Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 121 Id. 
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substantially impaired which occurs only when waste has reduced the 
value of the encumbered property to less than the unpaid balance of the 
debt.”122 Under this rule, “[o]nly damage rising to the level of ‘substantial 
injury’ is considered waste.”123 
Some courts applied the more stringent waste standard only where 
the plaintiff sought damages and have been reluctant to apply the rule in 
the context of injunctions. In Williams v. Chicago Exhibition Co., the 
court focused on the traditional view of fixtures as a part of the mortgage 
security, and reasoned that an injunction was reasonable to prevent the 
defendant from “removing [fixtures], as such removal might impair the 
mortgage security.”124 In this particular case, the court did not find it 
necessary to decide the issue, as the court determined that even if the 
strict rule applied, the allegations were sufficient.125 
3.     Bad Faith Cases Only 
Courts have also chosen to limit mortgagees’ suits to particularly 
egregious situations where there is evidence of bad faith.126 This rule 
essentially prohibits a mortgagee from recovering deficiencies except in 
those instances. For example, California courts have concluded that 
“[t]he antideficiency statutes do not apply when the borrower has 
committed  ‘bad faith’  waste  resulting  in  impairment of the security.”127  
 
 122 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Spencer’s Kenosha Bowl, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1987) (citing David A. Leipziger, The Mortgagee’s Remedies for Waste, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 
1086, 1097 (1976); see also Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 990 (Cal. 1975) (“It will be 
recalled that damages in an action for waste are measured by the amount of injury to the security 
caused by the mortgagor’s acts, that is by the substantial harm which ‘impair(s) the value of the 
property subject to the lien so as to render it an inadequate security for the mortgage debt.’” 
(quoting Robinson v. Russell, 24 Cal. 467, 473 (1864))). 
 123 Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 241 P.3d 1256, 1260–61 (Wash. 2010) (quoting 
Moore v. Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Co., 159 P. 779, 780 (1916). 
 124 Williams v. Chi. Exhibition Co., 58 N.E. 611, 615–16 (Ill. 1900) (quoting 10 AMERICAN 
AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 875 (John Houston Merrill ed., Northport, Edward 
Thompson Company1889)). 
 125 Id. 
 126 See, e.g., Evans v. Cal. Trailer Court, Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 652 (Ct. App. 1994) (limiting 
waste cases by mortgagees to bad faith injuries). 
 127 Id. 
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The courts define bad faith waste as “reckless, intentional or malicious 
injury to the property.”128 Most importantly, the courts distinguish this 
form of waste from “waste caused by mortgagors who are subject to the 
economic pressures of a market depression.”129 In other words, “[a] 
defense exists to bad-faith waste if the failure to maintain the real 
property was the result of economic necessity.”130 
II.     SHOULD MORTGAGEES HAVE STANDING FOR WASTE ACTIONS? 
With standing for mortgagees an innovation from the traditional 
common law doctrine—and one that has not been accepted in all 
jurisdictions, or accepted in only a limited fashion—the question 
becomes whether mortgagees should have standing to sue for waste. First, 
this Part considers a theoretical approach to the question based on the 
nature of the mortgagees’ interest in the property. Second, this Part 
considers how the lien or title approach has influenced states with respect 
to adoption of the substantial impairment limitation on mortgagees. 
Finally, this Part addresses the relationship between title or lien theory 
and the adoption of possession as a requirement for mortgagees, thus 
effectively preventing remedies for the mortgagee before foreclosure. 
A.     The Post-Subprime Mortgage Collapse Context 
There is every reason to make regulatory choices carefully after the 
global financial crisis. While banks and regulators have denied 
responsibility, a recent study concluded that “financial 
regulators . . . repeatedly designed, implemented, and maintained 
policies that helped precipitate the global financial crisis. . . . [T]hey 
recklessly endangered the global economy.”131 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 D.A.N. Joint Venture v. Binafard, No. 97-55778, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2626, at *2–4 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 18, 1999). 
 131 JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR. & ROSS LEVINE, GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING 
REGULATORS WORK FOR US 4–5 (2012). But see Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime 
Crisis, 104 VA. L. REV. 235 (2018) (arguing that deregulation was not a cause of the subprime 
mortgage crisis). 
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In particular, studies have shown that a lack of regulation in home 
lending paved the way for the financial crisis.132 In short, “subprime 
securitization may represent one of the greatest structurally-caused 
financial implosions of the modern world.”133 Scholars quibble about the 
shares of blame and cite a variety of sources. Yet, key studies concur in 
finding that lending practices were a prime factor.134 
In response to the financial crisis, the majority of states enacted laws 
that restricted subprime lending.135 Regrettably, those changes came 
rather late. In the years leading up to the crisis, scholars discussed the 
problem of predatory lending, including in the subprime mortgage 
market, but stopped at actually preventing subprime lending, finding that 
“the best avenue for redressing predatory lending would be a direct 
approach that focuses on abusive loan terms and practices, without 
imposing usury limits.”136 
In the aftermath of the crisis, we know that regulation in the 
mortgage context is important. Similarly, because waste actions by 
lenders may allow lenders to pursue claims against borrowers after 
foreclosure and bankruptcy, it is important to consider whether lenders 
should have standing both as a matter of social policy and in terms of the 




 132 See generally Alan White et al., The Impact of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247 (2011). 
 133 Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1260 (2009). 
 134 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1177, 1181 (2012) (arguing that the housing bubble was primarily caused by an excessive 
supply of housing finance); White et al., supra note 132 (citing lending practices as a primary 
cause of the financial crisis). 
 135 White et al., supra note 132. 
 136 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics 
of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (2002). 
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B.     Logical Approach of Title Theory 
Within waste law, the ownership interest provides the lynchpin for 
standing for a claim. The reasoning is simple: 
a party seeking to enjoin a particular use of land as waste must 
have a sufficient stake in the value of the ownership interest to 
warrant judicial interference to protect that value. While that 
interest might be a future interest or might be contingent, it 
must be an ownership interest.137 
Focusing on this ownership interest, one way to approach whether 
lenders logically should have standing to sue for waste would be to 
consider whether the lender actually holds any type of title interest in the 
property at issue. Specifically, standing might logically flow from whether 
a state adopts a lien or title theory of mortgages. Unfortunately, that does 
not necessarily provide us with straightforward answers. 
Professor Ann Burkhart has written about the complexities of lien 
and title theories of mortgages.138 Burkhart finds that “commentators 
have categorized states according to one of three theories concerning the 
effect a mortgage has on title to the encumbered land.”139 Burkhart 
explains “[t]he states that cling to common-law or title nomenclature and 
theory are denominated title theory states.”140 On the other hand, “[t]hose 
states that treat a mortgage as conveying no title to the mortgagee but as 
creating only the right to sell the property to satisfy the secured debt in 
the event of default are denominated lien theory states.”141 Finally, yet 
another group of states “follow the intermediate theory, treat[ing] a 
mortgage as conveying to the mortgagee the right to possess the 




 137 Doramus v. Rogers Grp., Inc., No. M1998-00918-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
127, at *42 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001). 
 138 Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 322–25 (1987). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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Burkhart has also studied the representation of these different 
approaches across the United States. She notes, “[a] 1902 survey of the 
states’ mortgage laws characterized sixteen states as following the title 
theory of mortgages and twenty-three states and territories as following 
the lien theory.”143 On the other hand, “[b]y 1965, only eight states—
Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—still adhered to the title theory, and 
twenty-eight states accepted the lien theory.”144 In her update, she adds 
that, “Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Rhode Island continue to describe a mortgage as 
conveying title to the mortgagee. Relatively recent decisions indicate that 
Pennsylvania may be shifting to the lien theory, though Pennsylvania 
courts also have rendered contrary decisions relatively recently.”145 
To add to the complexity, Burkhart is unsure that the labels give us 
very much information about how a state actually treats mortgages in the 
actual laws and practices of the jurisdiction. She notes, “[i]n some title 
theory states, statutes alter or remove the very legal incidents that once 
denoted title theory treatment of mortgages.”146 Additionally, there are 
some jurisdictions where “courts in title theory states have held that a 
mortgage does not convey title to the property to the lender, but only 
certain rights to possess and to sell the property to satisfy the loan in the 
event of default.”147 As a result, we can really draw few conclusions about 
a state’s approach to mortgages from the designation of a particular state 
as following either a title or lien theory. 
More importantly, Professor Burkhart’s overall view of the system is 
significant for waste law: Her overall conclusion is that, “even in title 
theory states, the mortgage is recognized as the appurtenance of the 
secured debt rather than as a title conveyance.”148 If she is correct about 




 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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perspective to give standing to mortgagees, because the traditional value 
of waste law was in protecting title interests. 
Courts have considered whether property law of the state 
approaches mortgages with a title or lien theory when determining 
whether to offer standing to mortgagees. The Fourth Circuit engaged this 
question in depth in Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc.149 The court 
concluded that “[l]ien states, generally, only allow a mortgagee to recover 
for waste if the value of the collateral goes below the amount of the 
outstanding indebtedness.”150 By contrast, title theory jurisdictions “allow 
a mortgagee to recover for any diminution in the value of security given 
for a debt.”151 The court viewed the title approach as distinct because “any 
diminution in value injures the mortgagee’s property in a title state. In a 
lien state, the mortgagee has no property interest which can be 
injured.”152 The court notes, however, that one cannot depend on courts 
for consistency: “Neither lien state courts nor title state courts have 
followed a consistent ‘party line’ in all mortgage cases.”153 The court 
concludes that, “the generality that South Carolina is a lien state does not 
decide the issue of damages in the present case.”154 
Some courts have been explicitly influenced by their state’s approach 
to lien versus title for mortgage interests. The Alabama Supreme Court 
explained, “when, as in this State, the mortgagee is regarded as the owner 
of the fee, and the mortgagor in possession as his tenant, there is 
additional ground for interference to restrain waste.”155 Similarly, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded, “[a] mortgagee is not in a 
general sense the owner of the mortgaged estate. Before foreclosure, his 




 149 Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. (citation omitted). 
 153 Id. (citing Wesley A. Sturges & Samuel O. Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property 
Mortgages, 37 YALE L.J. 691, 713–15 (1928)). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Malone & Foote v. Marriott, 64 Ala. 486, 492–93 (1879) (citation omitted). 
 156 Morse v. Whitcher, 15 A. 207, 209 (N.H. 1888). 
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court limited the remedies of the mortgagee, saying his rights were only 
those as “may be necessary to enable him to prevent waste.”157 
Some states, however, are not particularly motivated by the title or 
lien approach. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained, “[a]lthough a 
mortgagee only has a lien on the mortgaged property, he or she is entitled 
to maintain a legal action for waste against a mortgagor.”158 
C.     Title Theory and the Imposition of Limitations on Mortgagees 
The title versus lien approach of the state may also contribute to the 
courts’ reasoning in adopting limitations on waste actions in the context 
of mortgages. This includes both limiting mortgages to the context of 
equity and also imposing a barrier of substantial impairment of the 
security interest. 
With respect to limiting mortgagees to suits for equitable remedies, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court has addressed the importance of the title 
theory in the mortgage context generally. The court noted that “the law 
of mortgages is built primarily on a series of legal fictions ‘as a convenient 
means of defining the various estates.’”159 The court explained, “[d]espite 
our title theory of mortgages, ‘[i]n substance and effect . . . and except for 
a very limited purpose, the mortgage is regarded as mere security . . . and 
the mortgagor is for most purposes regarded as the sole owner of the 
land.’”160 The court then concluded that “[t]he mortgagee ‘has title and 
ownership enough to make his security available, but for substantially all 
other purposes he is not regarded as owner.’”161 As of 1900, Connecticut 
had rejected allowing a mortgagor to be liable to the mortgagee for 
waste.162 The court refused to “in effect make the mortgagor in possession 
liable to an action at law for waste, while under our law heretofore he has  
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Spencer’s Kenosha Bowl, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109, 111–12 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
 159 Red Rooster Constr. Co. v. River Assocs., Inc., 620 A.2d 118, 122 (Conn. 1993) (quoting 
Ensign v. Batterson, 36 A. 51, 54 (Conn. 1896)). 
 160 Id. (quoting McKelvey v. Creevey, 45 A. 4, 5 (Conn. 1900)). 
 161 Id. (quoting McKelvey, 45 A. at 5). 
 162 McKelvey, 45 A. at 6–7. 
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not been regarded as liable at law for waste.”163 Kentucky followed a 
similar approach, historically. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found, 
“[t]he mortgagee, as has been adjudged by this court, had only a lien on 
the property for the payment of his debt, and could only enforce it by 
going into a court of equity, subjecting the property to its payment.”164 
Similarly, the lien or title approach of a state may motivate adoption 
of the impairment standard. In 1940, the New York Superior Court 
explained: 
In this state the mortgagor has long been regarded both at law 
and in equity as the owner of the fee, and it must be borne in 
mind that this is not an action for waste such as might be 
maintained were the plaintiff here the landlord and the 
defendant the tenant . . . .165 
 Because of this, the court noted the emphasis must be on “the 
impairment of its security resulting from the wrongful act of the 
defendant.”166 Based on this, the court found “the plaintiff must prove (1) 
a wrongful act of the defendant; (2) impairment of security resulting from 
that act; and (3) the amount of such impairment.”167 Thus, the title in the 
borrower convinced the court that it was important to establish the 
impairment of the security before the mortgagee could have an action for 
waste. 
On the other hand, while Tennessee maintains title in the 
mortgagee, the jurisdiction still adopted a standard of impairment after 
consideration of the property interest at issue.168 The Tennessee Supreme 
Court explained, “[t]he title that passes to the mortgagee where the 
mortgagor remains in possession is a potential right to protect the estate 
from  impairment  of the security to such  extent as would defeat payment  
 
 163 Id. at 6. 
 164 Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568, 570 (1880). 
 165 Syracuse Sav. Bank v. Onondaga Silk Co., 26 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Lieberman, Loveman & Cohn v. Knight, 283 S.W. 450, 454 (Tenn. 1926) (“While in theory 
the rule prevails in Tennessee that the mortgagee takes the legal title and is entitled to possession, 
in practice the doctrine is only applied when necessary to protect the mortgagee’s security 
afforded by the estate.”). 
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of the debt secured.”169 The court concluded that interest in the property 
was sufficient to allow the mortgagee to “restrain waste by the mortgagor 
or a third person,” or to “sue and recover damages for acts done to the 
estate which impair the security.”170 
D.     Title Theory and the Possession Requirement 
States may also put a great deal of emphasis on which party is in 
possession of the property as of the time of filing suit. Connecticut courts 
have not refused waste actions where the mortgagor had already lost 
possession of the property and was, in fact, insolvent.171 The Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky held in 1880 that “[n]o action for waste can be 
maintained by the mortgagee against the mortgagor while the former is 
the owner and in the possession.”172 
New York courts explained in more detail why possession should 
matter in the context of a mortgage relationship-based action for waste. 
The key question is “whether a mortgagee can maintain an action of waste 
against the mortgagor, before the forfeiture of the mortgage.”173 The 
question matters because if there has been no forfeiture, then there has 
been no “expiration of the time limited for the payment of the money 
secured by the mortgage.”174 If the expiration has not occurred, this 
matters in the context of waste law because “[w]aste is an injury done to 
the inheritance, and the action of waste is given to him who has the 
inheritance in expectancy, in remainder, or reversion.”175 Based on this, 




 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 E.g., BRE, Inc. v. Superior Block & Supply Co., CV 95380707, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2783, at *8 (Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1997) (“The mortgagee has title and ownership enough to make 
his security available, but for substantially all other purposes he is not regarded as owner . . . .”). 
 172 Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568, 570 (1880). 
 173 Peterson v. Clark, 15 Johns. 205, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
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interest in the land is contingent, and may be defeated by payment of the 
money secured by the mortgage.”176 
Other states find possession less persuasive. Massachusetts holds 
that “it has long been settled in this commonwealth that as to all the world 
except the mortgagee the mortgagor is the owner of the mortgaged lands 
at least until the mortgagee has entered for possession.”177 Yet the court 
finds: 
Whether the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged 
premises or not, or whether his right to possession begins only 
with the breach of condition and there has been no breach, 
nevertheless he has such an interest in the property and its 
preservation as enables him to maintain an action in his own 
name for injury to it.178 
The court’s reasoning is that “[s]uch right of action is founded not 
upon the right to present possession, but on title to the estate.”179 Notably, 
Massachusetts concludes that there does not even have to be inadequate 
security: “He may maintain such an action, although his is a junior 
mortgage and although the security remains ample for his protection. He 
has a right to his security unimpaired.”180 The court concludes that 
possession is quite irrelevant in the mortgage context: “An action for such 
injury lies as well against the mortgagor, although rightfully in 
possession. The mortgagor is liable to the mortgagee for waste.”181 
Similarly, found itself faced with the question of whether possession 
mattered when it found that there was no clear answer under state law.182 
The  court  reasoned that “it is the majority view in the United  States that  
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Delano v. Smith, 92 N.E. 500, 501 (Mass. 1910) (quoting Dolliver v. St. Joseph Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 128 Mass. 315 (1880)). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Genesco Inc. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 577 F. Supp. 72, 84–85 (D.S.C. 1983) (“Where 
there is no legislative or judicial pronouncement on a question of state law, a federal court under 
Erie must respond to the novel question as it believes the state judiciary would under the identical 
circumstances using the state decision making processes.”). 
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a mortgagee may maintain an action for waste prior to a default in the 
mortgage covenants or the commencement of a foreclosure action.”183 
The court found the lien versus title question not particularly relevant: 
This is true whether the mortgagee has fee title to, or merely a 
lien upon, the mortgaged premises because “a mortgage is 
everywhere considered as passing the title to land, so far as may 
be necessary for the protection of the mortgagee, and to give him 
the full benefit of his security.”184 
III.     BANKRUPTCY LAW AND LENDER WASTE CLAIMS 
This Part focuses on what happens when judgments from lender 
waste claims flow into the bankruptcy courts and the unique problems 
that arise in these circumstances. In particular, this Part focuses on 
discharge and constitutional concerns arising from the potential inability 
to discharge waste claims in bankruptcy. 
A.     Bankruptcy and Residential Mortgages 
In theory, the “Bankruptcy Code supports home ownership.”185 We 
would expect this, given that home ownership is generally considered a 
preferable social goal.186 Scholars have argued a variety of reasons to 
prefer home ownership, most falling into these three primary categories: 
“(1) it builds household wealth and economic self-sufficiency; (2) it 
generates positive social-psychological states; and (3) it fosters stable 
neighborhoods   and   communities.”187   Property   theorists   have   long  
 
 183 Id. at 84 (citing Hummer v. R.C. Huffman Const. Co., 63 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1933); Arnold 
v. Broad, 62 P. 577 (Colo. App. 1900)); W.R. Inv. Co. v. Edwards Supply Co., 24 N.E.2d 518 
(Mass. 1939); Delano, 92 N.E. 500; Syracuse Sav. Bank v. Onondaga Silk Co., 14 N.Y.S.2d 356 
(App. Div. 1939); Garliner v. Glicken, 196 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Spec. Term 1960)). 
 184 Genesco Inc., 557 F. Supp. at 84 (quoting Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 258–59 
(1891)). 
 185 Salta Grp., Inc. v. McKinney, 380 B.R. 515, 524 (C.D. Ill. 2008). 
 186 Id. (“Home ownership is a highly desirable societal policy, which the federal government 
supports.”). 
 187 Jacoby, supra note 23, at 2262. 
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recognized an American obsession with home ownership and the role 
that it plays in wealth building within American society.188 
Unsurprisingly, research suggests that home ownership is the best 
predictor of middle class status.189 Bankruptcy law respects these social 
commitments. As one district court judge recently observed, interpreting 
bankruptcy law requires recognizing “[h]ome ownership and job 
preservation [as] social goals to which Congress has been committed for 
decades in numerous statutes.”190 
Yet, recent evidence suggests that the bankruptcy system does not 
offer substantial opportunities for salvaging home ownership. Recent 
empirical work has demonstrated that “in the majority of cases, the 
bankruptcy system is incapable of saving homes,” principally because 
current provisions of the bankruptcy code ensure that “an upside-down 
first mortgage cannot be reduced.”191 In short, borrowers will lose homes 
when the market value has dropped substantially, because courts will not 
reduce the loan to the market value.192 
The best that can be said for bankruptcy and home ownership is that 
bankruptcy provides an opportunity to eliminate personal liability for a 
past mortgage because such claims are dischargeable. After discharging a 
deficiency judgment, it is possible that a debtor may be rehabilitated such 
that home ownership would be possible in the future. 
Waste law, however, frustrates these protections. Using property 
and tort law, waste claims open the door to judgments that follow a 
borrower after foreclosure and bankruptcy. 
 
 188 See Joan C. Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326 (1998) (giving an 
account of American emphasis on home ownership in public rhetoric and noting the wealth 
accumulation function). 
 189 Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 
146 (2007). But see Ernesto A. Longa & Nathalie Martin, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do 
Payday and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 538 (2012) 
(finding that home ownership is the second predictor of middle class status). 
 190 In re Clemons, 404 B.R. 577, 583 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 191 See Gendler, supra note 21 and accompanying text. Most of these will be middle class 
homes; recent empirical studies demonstrate that filing for bankruptcy “is a middle-class 
phenomenon.” Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 119, 127–44 (2003). 
 192 Gendler, supra note 21, at 331. 
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B.     Bankruptcy and the Fresh Start 
The key purpose of the bankruptcy system for individuals is to 
provide a “fresh start” to the debtor.193 The “fresh start” language dates to 
a 1904 Supreme Court case and the general concept can be found as early 
as 1877.194 Currently conditions already reduce the potential for that fresh 
start: recent research shows that people are waiting longer to file 
bankruptcy, even though the delay means that they are less likely to have 
a fresh start on the other side of bankruptcy.195 Additionally, the time 
spent struggling before filing bankruptcy reduces overall wealth and well-
being, further diminishing their chances of that fresh start.196 Waste law 
exacerbates this situation, because waste claims follow borrowers in ways 
that a mortgage balance cannot. Waste claims create a personal judgment 
where state mortgage law prevents personal deficiency judgments on 
residences, and, because fixtures are willfully removed, waste claims will 
be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.197 
This Article argues that many lender waste claims will frustrate 
borrower protections in mortgage law, as well as the debtor’s right to a 
fresh start. The scope of dischargeability is directly related to how the 
debtor will fare in rebuilding financial security after a bankruptcy—i.e. 
how much of a fresh start the debtor will have.198 
C.     Constitutional Concerns: Waste, Bankruptcy, and Peonage 
Continuing payment obligations arising from waste judgments also 
create constitutional problems due to the loss of future earnings to pay a 
creditor. Scholars have repeatedly argued that circumstances requiring a 
creditor  to  be  repaid  with  future  earnings  may create a constitutional  
 
 193 Howard, supra note 24. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Foohey et al., supra note 8, at 223. 
 196 Id. at 221. 
 197 The Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge those debts “for willful and malicious injury 
by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2018). 
 198 Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions 
and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 61–89 (1990). 
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problem of peonage, or separation of a person from their labor in a way 
that resembles involuntary servitude.199 Renowned bankruptcy scholar, 
Margaret Howard, argued the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code, which allowed creditors to potentially reach a debtor’s future 
income, created “genuine constitutional difficulties under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”200 
Waste claims by lenders, this Article argues, create the same types of 
concerns by targeting income that postdates a foreclosure and/or 
bankruptcy. The role of waste in creating peonage is particularly 
important in light of studies that have demonstrated that subprime and 
predatory lenders particularly targeted blacks. Carol Brown, who has 
conducted empirical research on race and lending, concluded that “black 
borrowers are disproportionately victims of subprime mortgages.”201 
While some argued that subprime lending opened up homeownership to 
more people, including more minority families, Brown points to studies 
by the Center for Responsible Lending, which has found that subprime 
lending over a period of nine years resulted in more foreclosures than 
more new first-time homeowners and that this “holds especially true for 
African-American and Latino borrowers.”202 The Center also estimated 
that for the year of 2005, there would be an estimated 84,000 more 
foreclosures than first-time homeowners among African Americans and 
Latinos. Moreover, evidence showed that lenders knew they were 
extending inferior products to clients who qualified for better.203 
Specifically, Brown explained “that one half of all subprime borrowers 
 
 199 See e.g., Gross, supra note 31 (explaining bankruptcy would enslave debtors to creditors 
“[i]f we required individual debtors with no assets to repay their creditors out of future earnings,” 
because this would separate the person from their labor); Howard, supra note 18 (arguing that 
the Bankruptcy Code amendments of 2005 realized Thirteenth Amendment constitutional 
difficulties that had been speculative for decades); Sterk, supra note 31 (discussing whether and 
how human capital is exempt from creditor claims when compared to other types of property). 
 200 Howard, supra note 18, at 191. 
 201 Brown, supra note 19. 
 202 Id. at 913 n.24. 
 203 Id. at 913. Notably, Professor Cecil Hunt has argued for additional penalties in similar 
circumstances. Cecil J. Hunt II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted 
Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211 (2003). 
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actually qualified for conventional financing, a disproportionate number 
of which were black borrowers.”204 
Indeed, in a landmark case, the City of Miami sued Bank of America 
and Wells Fargo, bringing complaints under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 
alleging that the lenders “intentionally issued riskier mortgages on less 
favorable terms to African-American and Latino customers than they 
issued to similarly situated white, non-Latino customers.”205 The banks 
challenged the City’s standing as an “aggrieved person” under the 
statute.206 Focusing on the breadth of the statute, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the City successfully met the standard and thus had 
standing under the FHA.207 A number of additional jurisdictions have 
now brought similar claims, alleging discriminatory mortgage practices 
that targeted blacks and Latinos for riskier mortgages.208 Furthermore, 
evidence demonstrates that on the whole, “minority borrowers pay more 
on average for mortgages than non-minorities.”209 
If the racial composition of the class of subprime borrowers is 
consistent in lender waste cases, then more waste judgments would also 
fall disproportionately on blacks. This means that after being subjected to 
discriminatory lending practices that target blacks for subprime 




 204 Brown, supra note 19, at 913. Such discriminatory practices are not limited to the mortgage 
context. See Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2017) 
(addressing the credit industry and racism); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: 
Exclusion and Inclusion Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447 
(2018) (engaging systemic inequality and exclusion in the context of basic necessities, including 
housing). 
 205 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1299–301 (2017). 
 206 Id. at 1300. 
 207 Id. at 1301. The Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings, specifically to determine the proximate cause standard that should be applied. Id. 
 208 Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of 
Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100915 (N.D. 
Ca. June 15, 2018); City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-2203, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6443 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2018). For further discussion of such cases (including a list of pending 
unreported cases) and the social impacts of cities as plaintiffs, see Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 1227 (2018). 
 209 Kevin A. Clarke & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Mortgage Pricing and Race: Evidence from the 
Northeast, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 138, 138 (2018). 
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would also be trapped paying future earnings to those lenders due to 
waste judgments that could not be discharged. 
D.     Waste, Tort Judgments, and Discharge of Debts in Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy law marks few claims as non-dischargeable, because 
such continuing debts jeopardize the key purpose of bankruptcy law in 
providing a fresh start. Bankruptcy cases, legislative histories, and 
scholarly work document how carefully those choices are made and how 
those choices represent important social policies.210 Tort claims are one 
of the few non-dischargeable debts, but not all tort claims survive 
bankruptcy—only those that include “willful and malicious” acts.211 
There are good reasons for tort claims to be non-dischargeable, because 
otherwise bankruptcy could provide a convenient escape for intentional 
tortfeasors.212 Such restrictions on discharge become all the more 
important given that tort law ordinarily provides a variety of key social 
functions, including securing private duties for human rights within the 
domestic context.213 Understandably, Congress has chosen to secure 
some torts judgments past bankruptcy. 
This protection, however, was limited to those torts judgments that 
reflect  “willful  and  malicious”  injuries.  Courts  apply  this  as  a  single  
 
 210 Howard, supra note 24, at 1047–48 (tracing the various policy justifications behind the 
choices between discharge and non-discharge of debts in bankruptcy, then articulating a 
functional and economic approach to coherently integrating the multiple policy concerns to 
create a central theory of discharge). 
 211 Id. at 1051. 
 212 Id. at 1049 (explaining the concern that bankruptcy law could become “a shelter for debtors 
who have engaged in dishonesty or in culpable disregard for the rights of other persons”). 
 213 Recent scholarly work draws attention to the key role of torts in protecting individual 
human rights in a variety of important circumstances and ensuring a civil remedy for victims. 
See Laplante, supra note 30 (arguing that a variety of different types of tort cases work to secure 
human rights and provide remedies to individuals). Other scholars have similarly considered the 
role of private law in securing human rights. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 30 (considering what 
private duties may exist under human rights law); Miller, supra note 30 (describing human rights 
as tort harms in the context of the Alien Tort Statute); Paust, supra note 30 (examining private, 
rather than state, duties to comply with human rights law and potential private enforcement of 
those claims); Thomas & Beasley, supra note 30 (examining responses to domestic violence 
through a human rights lens). 
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standard that may be proven either via subjective intent or via “objective 
substantial certainty of harm.”214 Waste claims, possibly even permissive 
waste claims, will meet this standard, because the reasonable person 
understands that removing a fixture or failing to repair the falling porch 
will harm the property. As a result, waste claims are likely to be non-
dischargeable under the “willful and malicious” standard as it has been 
interpreted. 
Waste claims may be, in some cases, comparable to gambling cases. 
When borrowers sell fixtures from a home, such as appliances, the 
borrowers may be sending this money directly to the lender as a mortgage 
payment or otherwise applying it in their lives in a hope to avoid both 
foreclosure and bankruptcy. In other words, borrowers may be gambling 
on their ability to pull themselves out of their financial crisis in the future. 
In such cases, it may be more difficult to establish the intent of the 
borrower to commit fraud. Some cases suggest that courts have been 
sympathetic to the subjective beliefs of borrowers, although concerned 
with the rationality of the beliefs.215 A homeowner who believes their 
circumstances may look up may, indeed, be more reasonable in such 
beliefs than the gambler. A court could conclude, as one district court did 
in a gambling case, that, “many would consider her foolish, or that she 
made significant financial miscalculations, [but that] does not make her 
guilty of fraud.”216 
 
 214 Jonathon S. Byington, Debtor Malice, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1048 (2018). 
 215 See Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Servs., Inc. (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d 277, 282 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (describing the court’s views as “not unsympathetic” to a gambling debtor’s intent to 
repay but casting doubt on the realistic nature of that intent); cf. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. 
Baker, 205 F.3d 1332, *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (“It is easy to second-guess 
[the debtor’s] choices in hind-sight, but there is a difference between optimism and recklessness.” 
(citing In re Rembert, 141 F.3d at 282)). In Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Long, the 
court described a business reorganization effort, which may well have been a long shot, but “not 
necessarily a sham or hopeless from the beginning.” Based on that, the court was willing to rely 
on the debtor’s intent to benefit himself and others by risking money to try to re-establish the 
business. It might not have been good judgment under the circumstances, but the court could 
not find that the debtor was “intending or fully expecting to harm the economic interests of the 
creditor.” The court concluded, “knowledge that legal rights are being violated is insufficient to 
establish malice, absent some additional ‘aggravated circumstances.’” Barclays Am./Bus. Credit, 
Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 881–82 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). 
 216 In re Rembert, 141 F.3d at 282; see also Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 
B.R. 440, 453 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) 
(finding that the debtor “had an honest, if questionable and undoubtedly foolish, belief that she 
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I suggest waste cases should be treated more favorably than 
gambling cases in some circumstances. One reason for selling home 
fixtures is to acquire temporary cash, which may be used to pay the 
mortgage itself and thus postpone the possibility of foreclosure and/or 
bankruptcy. In such a situation, the lender has already obtained the 
money from the fixtures. Additionally, the homeowner was gambling on 
the possibility of better times—the possibility of avoiding a foreclosure 
and keeping the home. Given the special status of home ownership and 
its direct link to economic well-being of the family, it would be 
unfortunate to discourage the attempt to maintain the home if that is the 
family goal. 
E.     Resolving the Circuit Split in the Waste Context: Interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Tort Claim Discharge in the Context of a Lender Waste 
Action 
Torts judgments might not be dischargeable as debts in bankruptcy 
proceedings.217 Judgments arising from torts that were “willful and 
malicious” are not dischargeable.218 The rationale behind the “willful and 
malicious” rule is that the debtor should not be able to discharge a debt 
that arose from his wrongful conduct.219 
After years of debate over the correct interpretation of the intent 




could win enough to pay her debts”). But see AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re 
Mercer), 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding that “hoping to win is not synonymous 
with intending to pay”). 
 217 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2018). 
 218 Id. 
 219 Turbo Aleae Invs. v. Borschow (In re Borschow), 467 B.R. 410, 417 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2012). 
 220 See Tabb, supra note 198 (describing the standard as dating to 1898 but continuing to 
provide scholars with plenty to debate over a hundred years later); Karen N. Fischer, Comment, 
The Exception to Discharge for Willful and Malicious Injury: The Proper Standard for Malice, 7 
BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 248–59 (1990) (examining the options for interpretation of the willful and 
malicious provision). 
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malicious” standard in Kawaauhau v. Geiger.221 In Kawaauhau, the Court 
considered whether a medical malpractice judgment would be 
dischargeable given that it results from conduct that is negligent or 
reckless.222 The Eighth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, found that the 
important question is whether the judgment comes from an intentional 
tort or not.223 
The Supreme Court affirmed.224 The Supreme Court accepted the 
Eighth Circuit’s alignment of the “willful and malicious” standard with 
the traditional standard for an intentional tort: “that the actor intend ‘the 
consequences of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’”225 The Court revisited 
an earlier case, Tinker v. Colwell,226 which had set the standard for tort 
dischargeability, and reasoned that the outcome in Tinker depended on 
the finding that the debtor had acted in criminal trespass, which sounded 
as an intentional tort.227 
The Court concluded judgments arising from negligently or 
recklessly inflicted injuries could be discharged.228 The Court interpreted 
the “willful and malicious” exclusion to apply only to “acts done with the 
actual intent to cause injury.”229 The Court noted that this distinguished 
intentional acts that merely happen to cause injury.230 The Court 
reasoned that the provision refers to “a deliberate or intentional injury, 
not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”231 The 
Court avoided including “situations in which an act is intentional, but 
injury is unintended, i.e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the 
debtor.”232  The  Court avoided a broader construction  of  the  exemption  
 
 221 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998). 
 222 Id. at 59. 
 223 Id. at 60 (citing Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 61–62 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)) (emphasis omitted). 
 226 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). 
 227 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 63. 
 228 Id. at 59. 
 229 Id. at 61. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
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from discharge, reasoning that exceptions to discharge should be 
“confined to those plainly expressed.”233 A broader construction, the 
Court noted, could reach to a “‘knowing breach of contract.’”234 
Historically, the lower courts interpreted the “willful and malicious” 
standard through the Tinker language of actions that were “without just 
cause or excuse.”235 Kawaauhau displaced this standard, noting that the 
reasoning behind it was “less than crystalline.”236 Unfortunately, the same 
can be said of Kawaauhau, as there is still not a clear consensus. 
Indeed, the circuits have split over two different questions: (1) Did 
Kawaauhau address only one part of the willful and malicious standard 
or did the Court, in fact, collapse the two into a single standard? (2) Did 
Kawaauhau create a “totally ‘subjective’ standard which relates solely to 
the internal workings of the debtor’s mind,” or a more objective one?237 
The Third Circuit has not revisited the issue of tort discharge since 
the Kawaauhau decision. With that said, the courts of that circuit adhere 
to a Third Circuit standard that pre-dates Kawaauhau. The Third Circuit 
adopted the more objective approach, defining an action as “willful and 
malicious . . . ‘if they either have a purpose of producing injury or have a 
substantial certainty of producing injury.’”238 
Courts within the Fourth Circuit find that there is not a clear 
position.239 There is some evidence to suggest that the circuit court of 
Appeals would adopt the subjective analysis, but the evidence is limited 
to a comment without further discussion or cite to a precedent on either 
side of the subjective/objective divide.240 Additionally, the brief comment 
is less persuasive in light of an earlier unpublished opinion that suggests 
 
 233 Id. at 62 (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)). 
 234 Id. (quoting Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 235 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 107 
Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B.)). 
 236 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 63. 
 237 See Bank Calumet v. Whiters (In re Whiters), 337 B.R. 326, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) 
(discussing the various splits that have developed after Kawaauhau). 
 238 Heer v. Scott (In re Scott), 294 B.R. 620, 632 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Conte v. 
Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 239 Millsaps v. Yates (In re Yates), No. 05-50969, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1614, at *16 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2007). 
 240 Id. at *17 (citing Duncan v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 448 F.3d 725, 729 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
Fraley.41.2.2 (Do Not Delete) 2/7/2020 2:46 PM 
532 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:485 
the Fourth Circuit is following the divided subjective intent or 
“substantial certainty” model.241 
The Fifth Circuit found that Kawaauhau did not entirely distinguish 
between “torts substantially certain or certain to result in injury” and 
those “when a tortfeasor was merely indifferent to the injury and not 
acting with the end goal of causing that injury.”242 To not cover the second 
circumstance would be to adopt what is known as the “special malice” 
approach.243 The Fifth Circuit refused to do so, finding that “it would 
make nondischargeability unnecessarily rare.”244 The Fifth Circuit held 
that “for a debt to be nondischargeable, a debtor must have acted with 
‘objective substantial certainty or subjective motive’ to inflict injury.”245 
The Fifth Circuit has concluded:  
[Kawaauhau] never makes explicit whether it is analyzing solely 
the “willful” prong or the “willful and malicious” standard as a 
unit. Aggregating “willful and malicious” into a unitary concept 
might be inappropriate if the word they modified were “act,” but 
treatment of the phrase as a collective concept is sensible given 
the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the fact that the word they 
modify is “injury.”246  
With that said, the Fifth Circuit itself seems to have created a unitary 
standard: “[T]he term ‘willful and malicious injury’ is a single, unitary 
concept that is determined by a two-pronged test, namely, that ‘an injury 
is “willful and malicious” where there is either an objective substantial 
certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.’”247 The Fifth 
Circuit has clarified that it is not sufficient for the debtor to simply 
commit “a willful or knowing act.”248 
 
 
 241 Id. at *17–18 (citing Parsons v. Parks (In re Parks), 91 F. App’x 817, 819 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 242 Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 605 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Williams v. IBEW Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 508–09 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 603). 
 246 In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 606. 
 247 Se. Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Green (In re Green), No. 17-10058, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2050, at 
*8–9 (Bankr. M.D. La. July 6, 2018) (quoting In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 606). 
 248 In re Williams, 337 F.3d at 509. 
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The Sixth Circuit has adopted the dual approach of considering 
either specific intent for the consequences or the more objective 
substantial certainty that those consequences will occur.249 Thus, the 
standard is satisfied by either subjective or objective evidence of intent.250 
The Seventh Circuit found that “malicious” refers to the “conscious 
disregard of one’s duties.”251 The court further concluded that this 
standard does not refer to “ill-will or specific intent to do harm.”252 The 
Seventh Circuit’s definition focuses on the word “malicious,” rather than 
“willful.” And when courts interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kawaauhau as only interpreting the term “willful,” then the courts find 
that the Supreme Court did not overrule their more objective take on the 
discharge exemption.253 Thus, the Seventh Circuit continues after 
Kawaauhau to use the more objective approach. 
The Ninth Circuit found that the Supreme Court “did not specify 
what level of intent is necessary to satisfy the requirement that there be a 
‘deliberate or intentional injury.’”254 Part of the problem, the Ninth 
Circuit explained, is that the Court referred to the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, which itself is not clear.255 The Restatement’s primary text speaks 
of intent as though “the actor desires to cause consequences of his act,” 
but the comment includes the situation where the “actor knows or is 
substantially certain that the consequences will result from his act and 
continues despite this knowledge.”256 Noting the dual possibility that 
arises from the Restatement approach, the Ninth Circuit also accepted 
this subjective or objective approach.257 
 
 
 249 Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 250 Id. 
 251 In re Thirtyacre, 36 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 
610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 252 Id. at 700–01. 
 253 Bank Calumet v. Whiters (In re Whiters), 337 B.R. 326, 344 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) 
(explaining how older precedents continue to be interpreted as valid); see also Heer v. Scott (In 
re Scott), 294 B.R. 620, 632 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that the Third Circuit standard “seems 
to retain its vitality even though it pre-dates Geiger [sic]”). 
 254 Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 245 B.R. 131, 135 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 257 Id. at 136. 
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Rejecting the dual subjective/objective approach of the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit finds that Kawaauhau 
demands a subjective finding that “turns on the state of mind of the 
debtor.”258 In this circuit, the debtor “must have wished to cause injury or 
at least believed it was substantially certain to occur.”259 
Bankruptcy cases often involve allegations that a debtor acted 
intentionally to deprive a creditor of a security interest.260 In many 
instances, waste acts, such as failing to make repairs or removing fixtures, 
will occur because the debtor is in desperate financial straits. 
Unsurprisingly, in many of these circumstances, the debtor is, in fact, 
trying to continue to keep the property and avoid foreclosure on the 
family’s primary residence. Recent evidence about bankruptcy filings 
suggests that many families struggle for more than two years before filing 
and during that time may not only sell off all potential assets, but also go 
without basic necessities to try to avoid bankruptcy.261 In such 
circumstances, the lost value of fixtures may well have already been given 
to the lender in the form of a monthly payment. 
In the context of waste actions, I suggest that the odd nature of waste 
as both voluntary and involuntary will almost certainly cause problems 
for bankruptcy courts. Even if the trial court record correctly specifies the 
type of waste, the trial court’s opinion may not provide sufficient 
information for a bankruptcy court to know very clearly whether a 
debtor’s actions could be described as willful or malicious. 
Additionally, I suggest that in the context of waste actions, those 
circuits applying an objective standard are likely to find that waste claims 
cannot be discharged. In selling a fixture, the debtor is substantially 
certain of a drop in value of the property, but the debtor is essentially 
gambling on the ability to replace that fixture when they recover financial 
stability. In light of these types of situations, this Article proposes that in 
waste cases, the injury or harm should be interpreted as intentional only 
when the intent is to deprive the lender of the value of the fixture by acting  
 
 258 Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Englehart (In re Englehart), No. 99-3339, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22754, at *9 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2000). 
 259 Id. 
 260 See, e.g., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Cowin (In re Cowin), 492 B.R. 858 (S.D. Tex. 
2013) (alleging a conspiracy to deprive the creditor of a security interest). 
 261 See Foohey et al., supra note 8, at 221, 242–43. 
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maliciously. In other words, taking an axe to the bathtub is intentionally 
acting to harm the lender; selling a chandelier while trying to make house 
payments and get another job is not. Applying a more subjective standard 
of intending to harm the lender (as opposed to essentially gambling the 
value of the fixture on future financial stability) would not penalize 
borrowers for trying to make a recovery without going into bankruptcy. 
Moreover, this approach would maintain the fresh start for those honestly 
struggling borrowers on the other side of bankruptcy. 
IV.     PROPERTY LAW AND HARDSHIPS OF WASTE LAW FOR BORROWERS 
The evolution of waste law to include the mortgage context has the 
potential to create serious impacts for borrowers due to the way that some 
historical doctrines of waste play out in this specific context. In particular, 
waste law doctrines could work hardships for borrowers because of the 
doctrine of permissive waste, the potential availability of extraordinary 
remedies, the problem of measuring damages in the mortgage context, 
and the possibility of duplicative recovery or circumventing anti-
deficiency statutes. This Part addresses each aspect of waste law and how 
it may impact borrowers specifically based on existing precedents and 
continued confusion about the state of the law. Additionally, this part also 
reflects on how the use of waste law in the mortgage context does not fit 
with current approaches to property theory. 
A.     Permissive Waste 
Traditionally, common law courts distinguished between voluntary 
and permissive waste. Permissive waste was not always considered 
sufficient to sustain a claim for waste.262 Permissive waste arises not 
through malicious actions,263 but instead through some omission or 
 
 262 See Leipziger, supra note 12, at 1093–94, 1130–32 (concluding that in the common law 
there was originally no liability for permissive waste or waste caused only by negligence). 
 263 This is to be contrasted with active or voluntary waste which instead requires an affirmative 
act, causing destruction or alteration of the property. See Jowdy v. Guerin, 457 P.2d 745, 748 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1969). 
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failure to act in a timely fashion.264 Omissions might be related to 
maintenance not undertaken, but also might include the non-payment of 
taxes.265 
Permissive waste is particularly interesting in the context of 
mortgages because borrowers who are economically struggling may be 
unable to afford routine maintenance on the home, or may, at a 
minimum, delay such maintenance. Early on, some courts specifically 
refused to allow permissive waste claims against mortgagors, at least 
unless the contract provided such rights independently of the tort. In 
New Jersey, for example, “[u]nless it constitutes a breach of duty arising 
out of contract, the unassuming grantee of mortgaged lands is not liable 
to the mortgagee for permissive waste, even though the mortgage security 
is thereby rendered insufficient.”266 Some jurisdictions also continue to 
refuse permissive waste cases in the mortgage context. For example, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals refused to find that “the nonpayment of real 
estate taxes and mortgage interest” would sustain a cause of action for 
waste.267 
Notably, however, in some jurisdictions permissive waste is likely to 
be routinely (and, perhaps, unthinkingly) covered exactly as voluntary 
waste is simply because the jurisdiction does not distinguish between the 
two any longer. In such jurisdictions, all types of waste are treated 
identically. For example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that 
“[m]odern Wisconsin law does not distinguish between passive and 
active waste.”268 As a result, in the context of mortgages, the court 
“conclude[d] that the modern waste definition is broad enough in 
Wisconsin  to   include  both  active  and   passive   waste.”269   The  court’s  
 
 264 MINOR & WURTS, supra note 11, §§ 380, 386. Formally defined, “[p]ermissive waste 
implies negligence or omission to do that which will prevent injury, as, for instance, to suffer a 
house to go to decay for want of repair or to deteriorate from neglect.” Jowdy, 457 P.2d at 748–
49 (quoting Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 191 P.2d 858, 863 (Wash. 1948)). 
 265 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Clark & Lund Boat Co., 229 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Wis. 1975) 
(finding waste liability for failure to pay taxes). 
 266 Camden Tr. Co. v. Handle, 26 A.2d 865, 867 (N.J. 1942). 
 267 Chetek State Bank v. Barberg, 489 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). 
 268 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Spencer’s Kenosha Bowl, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 269 Id. 
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reasoning was, “[c]onduct which results either in active or passive waste 
‘may injure or threaten property rendering the debt unsafe.’”270 As a 
result, the court concluded, “[c]onsequently, the mortgagee’s security 
may be impaired by either passive or active waste and the policy for 
allowing the mortgagee recovery is the same regardless of the type of 
waste involved.”271 
A number of other courts follow Wisconsin’s position. California, 
similarly, does not distinguish between active and passive in the context 
of waste law.272 The courts define waste as “conduct, by both commission 
and omission, on the part of the person in possession of the property 
which impairs the value of the lender’s security.”273 In New Jersey, the 
courts concluded that “a mortgagor in possession is liable to a mortgagee 
for permissive waste which diminishes the mortgagee’s security, and 
renders it insufficient.”274 New York’s rules appear also to include 
permissive waste, requiring no “physical damage” to the property, and 
find sufficient just “impairment of the security of the mortgage.”275 
Some jurisdictions specifically include nonpayment of taxes as 
covered instances of permissive waste. Notably, in California, even while 
waste may be limited to instances of “bad faith,” the courts are willing to 
consider whether, in the circumstances, the nonpayment of taxes is done 
in bad faith.276 Michigan also covers nonpayment of taxes and 
 
 270 Id. (quoting Finley v. Chain, 374 N.E.2d 67, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)). 
 271 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 404 N.W.2d at 113. 
 272 D.A.N. Joint Venture v. Binafard, No. 97-55778, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2626, at *2–4 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 18, 1999). 
 273 Id. at *3 (quoting Evans v. Cal. Trailer Court, Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 652 (Ct. App. 
1994)). California does, however, qualify this position by providing a defense to a bad faith waste 
action (which would circumvent the anti-deficiency statutes), where “the failure to maintain the 
real property was the result of economic necessity.” Id. at *4. 
 274 Camden Tr. Co. v. Handle, 21 A.2d 354, 358–59 (N.J. Ch. 1941), rev’d, 26 A.2d 865 (N.J. 
1942). 
 275 Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 276 Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. 1333 N. Cal. Boulevard, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421, 427–28 (Ct. 
App. 2001). Notably, in this case the borrowers argued against considering passive, nonpayment 
of taxes as bad faith waste. The borrowers argued that such a holding “‘converts’ conduct which 
is only a breach of contract into a tort.” Id. at 428. The court found this argument “unconvincing,” 
noting that “[t]ax policy and tort law are separate fields.” The court reasoned, “[t]hat the state 
has chosen not to impose personal liability on property owners for real property taxes says 
nothing about owners’ liability to other persons for the tort of waste.” The court noted that waste 
generally “protected lenders from ‘any act which will substantially impair’ their real property 
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insurance.277 Wyoming follows the same rule,278 as does Washington,279 
Nebraska,280 and Wisconsin.281 
Additionally, the Restatement has provided support for the 
jurisdictions that allow liability for permissive waste in the mortgage 
context. The Restatement says that waste occurs when there is damage 
that reduces value, “whether negligently or intentionally.”282 
Additionally, the Restatement specifically includes situations where the 
mortgagor “fails to maintain and repair the real estate in a reasonable 
manner, except for repair of casualty damage or acts of third parties not 
the fault of the mortgagor.”283 The Restatement then expands this duty to 
fit with the mortgage contract provisions as well, suggesting that there is 
waste where the mortgagor “materially fails to comply with covenants in 
the mortgage respecting the physical care, maintenance, construction, 
demolition, or insurance against casualty of the real estate or 
improvements on it.”284 Finally, the Restatement addresses the issue of tax 
payments, finding that there is waste if the mortgagor “fails to pay before 
delinquency property taxes or governmental assessments secured by a 
lien having priority over the mortgage.”285 
Not all commentators, however, would agree with the Restatement 
approach. Christopher Tiedeman on The American Law of Real Property 
concludes instead that, “a mortgagor is not guilty of waste, on account of  
 
security.” The court then found that such a rule “can properly be extended to nonpayment of real 
property taxes regardless of whether the omission also creates tax or contract liability.” Id. at 429. 
 277 See Nusbaum v. Shapero, 228 N.W. 785, 789 (Mich. 1930) (failing to pay real estate taxes 
and insurance is waste). 
 278 See Grieve v. Huber, 266 P. 128, 134 (Wyo. 1928) (finding that “delinquent taxes and 
unpaid interest” are sufficient to constitute waste). 
 279 See Newman v. Van Nortwick, 164 P. 61, 62 (Wash. 1917) (holding that nonpayment of 
taxes is waste). 
 280 Phila. Mtg. & Tr. Co. v. Goos, 66 N.W. 843, 846 (Neb. 1896) (finding that delinquent taxes 
and unpaid interest constitute waste). 
 281 Schreiber v. Carey, 4 N.W. 124, 132 (Wis. 1880) (finding nonpayment of taxes or interest 
to be waste). 
 282 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 4.6 (AM. LAW INST. 1997). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
Fraley.41.2.2 (Do Not Delete) 2/7/2020 2:46 PM 
2019] MODERN WASTE LAW 539 
acts of omission. In the absence of an express covenant to repair, he is not 
guilty of waste, as against the mortgagee, if he fails to keep the premises 
in repair.”286 
Some courts, similarly, hesitate in treating permissive waste together 
with voluntary waste. The Supreme Court of North Dakota limited waste 
to more voluntary acts, concluding, “[w]aste implies neglect or 
misconduct resulting in material damage to property, but does not 
include ordinary depreciation of property due to age and normal use.”287 
Some jurisdictions specifically refuse to consider permissive waste 
claims based on the nonpayment of taxes. Wisconsin, for example, 
concluded that “nonpayment of interest and real estate taxes is not the 
type of physical damage necessary to a cause of action for tortious 
waste.”288 
B.     Problems of Remedies: Extraordinary Remedies Available for Waste 
The law of waste often provides rather extraordinary remedies for 
plaintiffs. The reasoning behind this was that the current possessor of the 
property was often someone who had a very limited claim to the estate 
(such as a life estate), while the plaintiff would have a much longer and 
more permanent interest (the reversion). In such circumstances, 
essentially punitive measures were necessary to ensure the safety of the 
estate when the current possessor might have every motivation to deplete 
the estate and no motivation to protect it for the future. As a result, the 
rule evolved that a life tenant would not only be liable for damages, but 
also would “forfeit ‘the thing that he hath wasted,’ and also pay treble 
damages.”289 
American courts continued the British approach, adopting both 
forfeiture  and  treble  damages as remedies. Courts concluded, “voluntary  
 
 286 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 265, at 384 (3d ed. 
1906). 
 287 Meyer v. Hansen, 373 N.W.2d 392, 395 (N.D. 1985) (citing Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831, 
834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 288 Chetek State Bank v. Barberg, 489 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). 
 289 Warlick v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 153 S.E. 420, 422 (Ga. 1930) (quoting Roby v. Newton, 
49 S.E. 694, 695 (Ga. 1905)). 
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acts of waste were deemed to terminate the right to possession and to 
entitle the owner to treat the former tenant as a trespasser.”290 
Additionally, in some jurisdictions statutes prescribed the remedy, 
including options for forfeiture and treble damages.291 
Some courts now specifically hold that forfeiture is only allowed 
when it is authorized by statute.292 Such an authorization will not be 
inferred, but must be “clearly” stated within the statute.293 
Notably, if forfeiture were included as a contract provision it might 
prove unconscionable and unenforceable, or at least enforceable only in 
particularly egregious circumstances. Consider how the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court approached this issue. The court found, “There are 
Oklahoma cases dealing with acceleration clauses in real estate mortgages 
which involve acceleration for failure to provide insurance or for 
commission of waste.”294 The court previously held that “acceleration 
clauses in a mortgage were not objectionable as being in the nature of a 
penalty or forfeiture.”295 With that said, the court limited the holding, 
noting “equity will relieve against operation of an acceleration clause 
where the conduct of the mortgagee has been unconscionable or 
inequitable.”296 
 
 290 Vollertsen v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 486, 497–98 (Or. 1987) (citing Parrott v. Barney, 18 F. Cas. 
1249, 1251 (C.C.D. Cal. 1868)); see also Sparks v. Lead Belt Beer Co., 337 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Mo. 
1960); Camden Tr. Co. v. Handle, 26 A.2d 865, 867–68 (N.J. 1942); Moss Point Lumber Co. v. 
Bd. of Supervisors of Harrison Cty., 42 So. 290, 292 (Miss. 1906); Chalmers v. Smith, 26 N.E. 95, 
96 (Mass. 1891). 
 291 See Belt v. Simkins, 39 S.E. 430, 430–31 (Ga. 1901) (discussing the state statutes and the 
options for remedies); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-106 (2019) (allowing treble damages); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.150 (2017) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65-3 (West 2019) (same); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 1-538 (2018) (originally 6 Edw. I, c. 5; 20 Edw. I, st. 2; R.C., c. 116, s. 3; Code, s. 629; 
Rev., s. 858; C.S., s. 893) (same). 
 292 See Landmark Tr. USA v. Smithies, No. CV085004967S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1785, at 
*15–16 (Super. Ct. July 13, 2010) (“The modern view is that forfeiture is not a remedy for waste 
in the absence of a permissive statute. Contrary to the position taken by the plaintiff, the court 
does not read § 52-563 to include a remedy of forfeiture of a life estate for waste.”). 
 293 Id. 
 294 Cont’l Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977). 
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. 
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C.     Problems of Remedies: Measuring When Waste Has Occurred 
Traditionally, waste law in the modern era has measured damages in 
terms of the change in market value of the property.297 Waste law across 
the jurisdictions has not always provided clear rules for measurement of 
damages in the context of mortgages.298 
Indeed, some jurisdictions do not have a single overall rule 
established. This is particularly problematic in the mortgage context, 
because the measurement of damages might or might not be done in 
relation to the market value of the property: “[A] number of states allow 
establishing damages for waste by showing either the difference in the 
market value of the property before and after injury, or by the cost of 
repair.”299 Addressing the lack of law in North Dakota, the Supreme Court 
of the state preferred the variety of options over choosing a single 
measurement rule.300 The court reasoned that “[g]iven the absence of an 
express legislative pronouncement, and given that the object of an award 
of damages is to compensate without unjust enrichment, we believe there 
should be no exclusive test for measuring property damage for waste.”301 
Instead, the court chose to “adopt the more flexible approach in which 
the  mode  and  amount  of  proof  must  be  adapted  to  the  facts of each  
 
 
 297 See Meyer v. Hansen, 373 N.W.2d 392, 396–97 (N.D. 1985) (“The general rule is that the 
measure of damages for waste is the difference between the market value of the property before 
and after the waste.” (citing Lustig v. U.M.C. Indus., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); 
Hamman v. Ritchie, 547 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); 93 C.J.S. Waste § 18 (2019); 78 AM. 
JUR. 2D Waste § 35 (2019)). Indeed, the market-based approach changed how waste law was 
defined within the nineteenth century. Jill M. Fraley, A New History of Waste Law: How a 
Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped Ideas About the Transformation of Law, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 861, 
863 (2017). 
 298 Meyer, 373 N.W.2d at 396–97. For example, “[t]he North Dakota statutory provision 
relating to waste, § 32-17-02, does not precisely specify that the measure of damages for waste is 
the difference between the market value of the property before and after the waste.” Id. at 396. 
 299 Id. (citing Jowdy v. Guerin, 457 P.2d 745 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)); Smith v. Cap Concrete, 
Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 308 (Ct. App. 1982); Duckett v. Whorton, 312 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1981); 
Johnson v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 485 P.2d 12 (Or. 1971). 
 300 Meyer, 373 N.W.2d at 396–97. 
 301 Id. at 396. 
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case.”302 The court concluded that “depending on the facts of each case, 
either diminution in value or cost of repair is the appropriate measure of 
damages for waste.”303 More than that, the court set up a presumption for 
the plaintiff: “Plaintiff has the right to elect the measure deemed more 
accurate and if the defendant disagrees, he has the burden to prove the 
alternative measure is more appropriate.”304 
The Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the problem of 
measuring waste damages in the mortgage context in 1986, noting the 
split across jurisdictions. The court explained, “[g]enerally, the measure 
of damages for waste is the difference between the fair market value of the 
property before and after the waste.”305 The court noted, on the other 
hand, “[s]everal states, however, allow an injured party to establish 
damages for waste by showing either the before-and-after difference in 
fair market value or by the reasonable cost of repair.”306 Mississippi, as of 
1986, “ha[d] never attempted to formulate a standard for measuring 
damages due to waste.”307 
Some jurisdictions measure the damage in terms of the impairment 
of the mortgagee’s security. The Restatement follows this approach, 
finding that the mortgagee can recover “damages, limited by the amount 
of the waste, to the extent that the waste has impaired the mortgagee’s 
security.”308 The distinction between thinking of the security interest 
 
 302 Id. (citing Ferraro v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Ct. App. 1980); Or. Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Mathis, 334 P.2d 186 (Or. 1959)). 
 303 Id. at 396–97. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Bell v. First Columbus Nat’l Bank, 493 So. 2d 964, 969 (Miss. 1986) (citing Meyer, 373 
N.W.2d at 396; Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 705 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waste § 32 (2019)); see also Prue v. Royer, 67 A.3d 895, 914 (Vt. 2013) 
(“Based on this principle, the traditional measure of damages in a claim for waste has been the 
reduction in property value beyond that caused by normal wear and tear.” (citing Lustig v. 
U.M.C. Indus., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982))); Meyer, 373 N.W.2d at 396. 
 306 Bell, 493 So. 2d at 969 (citing Meyer, 373 N.W.2d at 396). 
 307 Id. 
 308 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 4.6 (AM. LAW INST. 1997). The Restatement 
further explains: 
If the mortgage relationship has ended at the time the mortgagee claims waste, an 
impairment of security exists if the value of the real estate is less than the sum of the 
mortgage obligation and the obligations secured by any liens senior to the mortgage. 
If the mortgage relationship continues to exist at the time the mortgagee claims waste, 
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versus thinking of the damage to the market value matters. As a 
California court explained, it could limit the amount of recovery: 
Now this action is not based upon the assumption that the 
plaintiff’s (mortgagee’s) land has been injured, but that his 
mortgage as a security has been impaired. His damages, 
therefore, would be limited to the amount of injury to the 
mortgage, however great the injury to the land might be.”309  
 In such a jurisdiction, the mortgagee can only sue where “the 
property is rendered of less value as security for the mortgage debt,” and 
in such cases, “the damages to be awarded [would be] the amount of 
injury to the security resulting from the damage to the property.”310 
Finally, there is another special circumstance. As discussed 
previously, some courts limit recovery to those situations where the 
security interest is impaired, limiting mortgagor liability. In terms of 
damage measures, such jurisdictions are able to actually reduce the 
measure of waste effectively to zero in some instances. In other words, 
even if waste has occurred, there may be no cause provided that the 
property has increased in value in the market such that the security 
interest remains adequate. In other jurisdictions, it may not be clear 
whether such a requirement has been adopted: As the Fourth Circuit 
explained, “[w]e note that South Carolina law is not yet settled on the 
point of whether, in such circumstances, the reduction in value of the 
security becomes recoverable as waste although the value still may not 





an impairment of security exists if the ratio of the mortgage obligation to the real 
estate’s value is above its scheduled level. In such cases, the mortgagee may restore the 
ratio of the mortgage obligation to the real estate’s value to its scheduled level by 
obtaining an order compelling correction of the waste or by recovery of damages, 
limited by the amount of the waste.  
Id. 
 309 Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 986–87 (Cal. 1975) (quoting Van Pelt v. McGraw, 
4 N.Y. 110, 112 (1850)). 
 310 European Am. Bank v. Dupont Bldg. Assocs., 567 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 311 Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1984). 
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It is important, however, to think specifically about measuring waste 
in the context of an economic downturn. To understand this problem, it 
is appropriate to begin with a definition of a deficiency in the mortgage 
context. “A deficiency judgment is a personal judgment against the 
debtor-mortgagor for the difference between the fair market value of the 
property held as security and the outstanding indebtedness.”312 The 
California Supreme Court explained, “[i]t is clear that the two judgments 
against the mortgagor, one for waste and the other for a deficiency, are 
closely interrelated and may often reflect identical amounts.”313 
Additionally, the relationship between the two amounts will change 
depending on the economy and property values more generally. The 
court stated, “[i]f property values in general are declining, a deficiency 
judgment and a judgment for waste would be identical up to the point at 
which the harm caused by the mortgagor is equal to or less than the 
general decline in property values resulting from market conditions.”314 
Additionally, the court continued, “[w]hen waste is committed in a 
depressed market, a deficiency judgment, although reflecting the amount 
of the waste, will of course exceed it if the decline of property values is 
greater.”315 On the other hand, the court reflected, “[h]owever, when 
waste is committed in a rising market, there will be no deficiency 
judgment, unless the property was originally overvalued; in this event, 
there would be no damages for waste unless the impairment due to waste 
exceeded the general increase in property values.”316 
In California, a statute protects borrowers, proscribing “a deficiency 
judgment after any foreclosure sale, private or judicial, of property 
securing a purchase money mortgage.”317 The purpose of the provision is 
“‘in the event of a depression in land values, to prevent the aggravation of 
the downturn that would result if defaulting purchasers lost the land and 
were burdened with personal liability.’”318 
 
 
 312 Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 990. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. (internal citation omitted).  
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The California Supreme Court had to determine if the statute would 
apply to prevent an action in waste, a tort action, as distinct from an 
action based on a contract. The court reasoned, “[i]t is clear that allowing 
an action for waste following a foreclosure sale of property securing 
purchase money mortgages may often frustrate [the statute’s] 
purpose.”319 The court was particularly concerned that in some situations 
the “[d]amages for waste would burden the defaulting purchaser . . . and 
the acts giving rise to that liability would have been caused in many cases 
by the economic downturn itself.”320 The court explained, “[f]or example, 
a purchaser caught in such circumstances may be compelled in the 
normal course of events to forego the general maintenance and repair of 
the property in order to keep up his payments on the mortgage debt.”321 
The court concluded, “[i]f he eventually defaults and loses the property, 
to hold him subject to additional liability for waste would seem to run 
counter to the purpose of [the] section.”322 Additionally, such an outcome 
would “permit the purchase money lender to obtain what is in effect a 
deficiency judgment.”323 
The California Supreme Court then limited this rule, noting that 
sometimes waste is caused by “reckless, and at times even malicious 
despoilers of property.”324 The court categorized these as “bad faith” 
claims,325 which we have previously discussed. The court concluded, 
it is within the province of the trier of fact to determine on a case 
by case basis to what, if any, extent the impairment of the 
mortgagee’s security has been caused (as in the first instance) by 
the general decline of real property values and to what, if any, 
extent (as in the second instance) by the bad faith acts of the 
mortgagor.326 
The risk is that not all jurisdictions have an anti-deficiency statute 
like California’s and even those jurisdictions that do, may or may not use 
 
 319 Id. at 990–91. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. at 986–87, 991. 
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it to prevent a tort action in waste. This problem is particularly 
compelling given that the extension of waste law to mortgages has 
happened over an extensive period of time, often sporadically and often 
judicially. This is particularly important given that some of these 
concerns are interrelated. For example, the measurement of damages and 
the availability of a cause of action for permissive waste may combine 
together in some permutations of rules to particularly prejudice a 
borrower. 
D.     Problems of Remedies: Contract-Based Remedies & Duplication 
In the mortgage context, where there is a possibility of both a 
contract-based claim and a tort claim, there is also a risk of duplication. 
In 1995, a U.S. district court dismissed waste claims, because of the risk 
of a double recovery.327 Other courts have similarly reasoned that such 
duplication can occur. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed a waste 
suit, reasoning that it could not be maintained once there was a 
foreclosure suit.328 On the other hand, a New York appellate court found, 
“[a]n action for waste is not an action [to recover the mortgage] 
debt . . . and its pendency is not a defense to this action.”329 
The equitable doctrine of election of remedies could limit the risk of 
duplication. The purpose of the doctrine is “to prevent double recovery 
for the same wrong.”330 The doctrine generally is limited, however, to 
situations where a plaintiff maintains “inconsistent legal theories or 




 327 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Devon Bank, No. 94 C 5527, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9647, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1995). 
 328 See Edelman v. Poe, 103 So. 2d 333, 334 (Ala. 1958) (reasoning that any damages assessed 
applied to the mortgage indebtedness). 
 329 Ferraro v. Marrillard Builders, Inc., 238 N.Y.S. 188 (App. Div. 1929). 
 330 Minor v. Jacek, 694 N.W.2d 509 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005); see also Nw. State Bank, Osseo v. 
Foss, 197 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. 1972) (forbidding double recovery for the same wrong). 
 331 Minor, 694 N.W.2d at 509 (citing Bank of Commerce v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 
158 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Wis. 1968)); see also Covington v. Pritchett, 428 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1988) (forbidding recovery through inconsistent remedies). 
Fraley.41.2.2 (Do Not Delete) 2/7/2020 2:46 PM 
2019] MODERN WASTE LAW 547 
It may apply, however, simply because the causes of action sound in 
the two different and “inconsistent” fields of contracts and torts.332 
Additionally, “[a] court may properly order an election of remedies where 
the plaintiff’s two theories of relief are premised on the same acts of the 
defendant.”333 
The doctrine has been applied in the context of waste law. In 
Rudnitski v. Seely,334 the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed a case 
where the trial court ruled that waste and conversion claims were 
precluded.335 The court reasoned, 
[w]e must determine whether the action for waste and the action 
for conversion arose out of the contract for deed, and whether 
recovery under these theories is inconsistent with statutory 
cancellation of the contract. To make our decision, we examine 
the nature of these actions and their relationship to this 
contract.336 
This case was not a mortgage case, but a deed sale case. Still, the court 
approached the division of contract-based remedies and tort-based 
remedies.337 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals examined another case and 
concluded that where a contract contained a liquid damages provision, 
this “does not prevent recovery for actual damages caused by events not 
contemplated by the clause, ‘unless the contract expressly provides that 
damages other than those enumerated shall not be recovered.’”338 
E.     Lender Waste Claims and Modern Property Theory 
Modern property theory includes a variety of approaches, but an 
overarching  theme  of  these  is  a  focus  on  property  as  a  set  of  social  
 
 332 Minor, 694 N.W.2d at 509 (citing Carpenter v. Meachem, 86 N.W. 552, 553 (Wis. 1901)). 
 333 Id. (citing Wills v. Regan, 206 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. 1973)). 
 334 Rudnitski v. Seely, 441 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 335 Id. at 829–30. 
 336 Id. 
 337 Id. at 830. 
 338 Id. 
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relationships. Wesley Hohfeld re-conceptualized property rights as social 
relationships early in the twentieth century,339 and in the last forty years, 
many theorists have reemphasized this focus on property as social 
relationships.340 One strong thread within the social approach to property 
is the concern for property as a method of survival. This approach can be 
found in the classics, such as Locke,341 but also in modern property 
theory.342 
Within the context of waste law and lender claims, I would argue 
that if property is understood as a set of social relationships—and 
particularly ones centered on survival and conflict avoidance—then the 
home is a property. And waste law, which may be applied to any type of 
real property, should be interpreted to recognize the unique context of 
home ownership. Additionally, lender waste claims are being made in the 
specific context of foreclosures. A foreclosure or bankruptcy specifically 
indicates to us that the homeowner is in a position of jeopardy. This is 
precisely the survival context that is central to a social understanding of 
property. In light of this situation, an appropriate understanding of the 
nature of property should lead us to think carefully about how we allow 
the original doctrine of waste law to be adapted by lenders in this context. 
V.     PROPOSALS: WASTE DOCTRINES IN THE MORTGAGE CONTEXT 
This final Part reflects on the doctrinal evolution and theoretical 
points discussed in the earlier portions of the Article. This Part provides 
five specific recommendations for how waste law logically should evolve 
to  include  the  right  for  mortgagees  to sue, but with specific limitations  
 
 339 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 721 (1917). 
 340 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, 
in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3–20 (Charles 
Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000); Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW 
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36–75 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 
2001); CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994). 
 341 2 JOHN LOCKE, WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 27 (London 1714). 
 342 Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 28, 31 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose 
& Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 3d ed. 2002). 
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that are designed to protect particularly residential borrowers from the 
harshness that waste law doctrine might create if simply imported 
unthinkingly from the common law into the mortgage context. 
Injunctive relief should always be available to mortgagees to protect 
the adequacy of the security interest, provided that the issue is voluntary 
rather than permissive waste. 
Most courts expanded standing to mortgagees very early for the 
purposes of injunctions to restrain future waste of the mortgage security. 
Given that the mortgage holder does have a property right of some type 
and has a clear possibility of future ownership of the property, it is logical 
to protect that future right. 
With that said, in adopting the expanded standing rules, courts have 
not necessarily considered the distinction between permissive and 
voluntary waste. As noted above, courts have not necessarily made any 
distinction at all in other contexts (outside of mortgages). And some 
courts considered the issue of permissive versus voluntary waste at a 
different time and separately from the context of considering standing for 
a mortgagee. This Article argues that mortgagees should always have 
standing to prevent voluntary waste, but that standing for permissive 
waste should be limited to the commercial context. 
Extending this relief to permissive waste would be problematic for 
residential mortgage holders, particularly in the context of an economic 
downturn. A family may have made very reasonable choices to postpone 
repairs given family circumstances and may be able to catch up those 
repairs once their economic situation improves. Issuing an injunction 
would remove that choice from the homeowner and perhaps force them 
into a foreclosure situation that might otherwise be avoidable with some 
patience. 
Extraordinary remedies of waste law—forfeiture and treble 
damages—should not be available in the mortgage context via waste law. 
Many of the present possessory interests in property at the common law 
were quite brief or contingent (during marriage, before marriage, for life). 
As a result, the far greater interest in the property was held by the future 
interest holder. Additionally, the present interest holder had limited or 
no reason to act to protect the future interest holder. In those 
circumstances, extraordinary remedies such as treble damages and 
forfeiture protected the future interest holder. 
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The mortgage context is quite different. The mortgagee does not 
have an expectation of future possession. Indeed, the mortgagee is hoping 
not to take possession, but rather to have the mortgage satisfied. The 
mortgagee is protected so long as the security remains adequate to the 
balance owed on the mortgage. 
Additionally, the mortgagee is a sophisticated commercial party 
who acquired rights via a commercial transaction—indeed likely one in 
which the mortgagee was the more sophisticated party. During the course 
of that transaction, the mortgagee had the opportunity to adjust the 
contract in a variety of ways that would protect the mortgage company’s 
interest. 
In light of these concerns, extraordinary remedies of waste law 
should not be simply imported into the mortgage context. Such remedies 
should be made available only in limited circumstances where: (1) the 
waste is voluntary rather than permissive; (2) the mortgagee has written 
them into the contract; (3) the mortgage is commercial rather than 
residential; and (4) where such terms are not prohibited by either 
mortgage law more generally or by the concept of unconscionable terms 
in contract law. 
Where the property is a residence, and some portion of the 
reduction in property value is attributable to economics beyond the 
control of the mortgagor, the mortgagee should only be able to recover 
for waste committed in bad faith. Alternatively, where it is unclear how 
much of a drop in value is due to damages and how much is due to the 
market, the burden of proof should shift to the plaintiff (the lender) to 
establish the amount exclusively for repairs and that should be the 
measure of damages. 
Where damages are awarded in a waste action within a bankruptcy 
proceeding, discharge of the judgment should be available unless the 
lender can prove actual malice. It should not be sufficient to just allege an 
“objective substantial certainty of harm.” 
Part IV above explains how little agreement there is across 
jurisdictions on the proper measure of damages for waste law. 
Importantly, a number of jurisdictions do not maintain a single measure 
of damages, and a number of jurisdictions measure damages based on 
property values rather than costs of repair. 
Where property values contribute to the measure of damages, it may 
be very difficult if not impossible to separate the drop in value caused by 
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an economic downturn from the drop in value caused by waste—
particularly permissive waste. To prevent residential property owners 
from being liable in such situations for more than a fair amount or for 
damages that they may not have been able to afford to repair, the 
California rule of restricting recovery to proof of bad faith makes sense. 
The reasoning behind the California rule is that in such circumstances, 
the judgment would be for personal liability exceeding the mortgage and 
would burden the family moving forward in the process of finding 
housing. Given that statutes regularly protect borrowers from deficiency 
judgments that would create personal liability, there is no reason to allow 
the tort of waste law to provide a work-around for such statutes. 
Additionally, bankruptcy was intended to provide for that fresh 
start—and that can only happen without a mortgage following the 
petitioner forward after the bankruptcy. For this reason, the bankruptcy 
code’s discharge of torts provision should be applied to waste causes of 
action narrowly, allowing discharge of waste judgments unless the lender 
is able to prove that the borrower acted with actual malice in damaging 
the property. 
Mortgagees should not be able to use waste law to sue for permissive 
waste in a residential context, except where that waste was committed in 
bad faith, meaning with actual malice. 
If the failure to maintain the property or pay taxes or insurance is 
attributable to the economic circumstances of the mortgagor, the 
mortgagee should be limited to the recourses permitted by the mortgage 
contract and relevant state law. 
Because waste law is a remedy in tort and a mortgagee will always 
have remedies available through contract, the mortgagee should be 
limited to recovery where the damages creates a “substantial impairment” 
of the security. 
As a tort, waste law directs itself not to minor incidents but rather 
important changes in a property. Consistent with that approach and 
acknowledging that the mortgagee is not without a number of remedies 
in contract law, there is little reason to allow a mortgagee to pursue a tort 
claim in addition to contract claims without being able to prove a 
substantial impairment of the security interest. 
Fraley.41.2.2 (Do Not Delete) 2/7/2020 2:46 PM 
552 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:485 
CONCLUSION 
From the time of the 2008 economic downturn and subprime 
mortgage collapse, lenders began in earnest to sue borrowers under a new 
theory of liability: tort claims for waste. Waste claims, often based on 
removing fixtures, work around state mortgage laws that prohibit 
personal deficiency judgments after a foreclosure and are likely to be non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy because fixtures are willfully removed. Most 
disturbingly, waste often measures damages based on market values, 
which means borrowers may pay, via a torts judgment, for not only the 
value of missing fixtures that were sold during tough times, but also for a 
drop in market value. 
The expansion of the narrow common law approach to standing to 
include mortgagees fits with property theory more generally. Standing is 
appropriate for lenders, but this does not mean that the doctrines of waste 
should be incorporated into the mortgage context without substantial 
and thoughtful inquiry. Such doctrines evolved in very different 
economic circumstances and with very different property interests being 
protected. 
Some doctrines, such as extraordinary remedies, are remarkably 
unfair to import into the residential mortgage context. Others should be 
limited in the mortgage context in recognition of the contractual 
remedies available to the mortgagee as well as the mortgagee’s general 
status as the more sophisticated and powerful of the two parties to the 
contract. This Article has proposed uniform adoption of a wider rule of 
standing for mortgagees in both law and equity, but has proposed a 
number of limitations based on property theory and the history of the 
doctrine.  
Additionally, this Article has examined the intersections of 
bankruptcy and lender waste claims, proposing a solution for how to treat 
the intent requirements for discharging tort claims given the history of 
waste doctrine. This Article proposes that in waste cases the injury or 
harm should be interpreted as intentional only when the intent is to 
deprive the lender of the value of the fixture. Applying a more subjective 
standard of intending to harm the lender (as opposed to essentially 
gambling the value of the fixture on future financial stability) would not 
penalize borrowers for trying to make a recovery without going into 
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bankruptcy. Moreover, this approach would maintain the fresh start for 
those honestly struggling borrowers on the other side of bankruptcy. 
